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Introduction 
 
Fourteen months since the agreement for the first national bailout in EMU 
history, the Greek crisis keeps unfolding at a mesmerising pace. In June 2011 
things took a dramatic turn, as the poor evaluation of the government's efforts to 
deliver on the obligations it had undertook under the Memorandum for the 
€110bn loan, especially with regard to the programme of privatisations, the 
tackling of tax evasion, the liberalisation of closed professions and the 
consolidation of public bodies, triggered a new mini-crisis. The open questioning 
by the Eurozone and IMF officials of the continuation of funding under the 
€110bn loan led to an almost-farcical political crisis, with the PM announcing his 
willingness to step down in exchange for the formation of a coalition government 
and a few hours later backtracking to form a new partisan cabinet aiming to calm 
within-party and wider public opposition to the policies pursued by the 
government.  
A fast-track procedure of negotiations with the eurozone partners and the IMF 
followed, leading to a new re-specified austerity programme which finally went 
through parliament allowing for the continuation of funding from the EU-ECB-
IMF 'troika'. The severity of this mini-crisis seems to have constituted a wake-up 
call for Greece's eurozone partners who adopted quite swiftly a somewhat more 
proactive and, to some extent, accommodating approach, taking important 
initiatives to avert the full collapse of the Greek economy and its eventual 
default. The eurozone leaders agreed to pursue a deal with private Greek-bond-
holders for voluntary participation in a restructuring of the Greek debt. They 
committed to providing a new loan (a second bailout) for 2012 and, crucially, 
started looking for ways to combine the austerity-minded fiscal consolidation 
measures with an injection of funds aiming at stimulating growth – although 
austerity and fiscal consolidation remain very much the central objectives. 
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Barring a destabilisation of the political situation in Greece, the combination of 
these initiatives – if indeed followed through – has the potential to halt the 
continuous deterioration of Greece's debt and GDP figures, putting at last the 
country on a (slow, but at least now possible) path to recovery. 
The events of June 2011, and those that are to follow in the months ahead, have a 
pace that academic inquiry, due to its own nature, finds it very difficult to follow. 
Before a full analysis of the consequences of any given policy initiative is 
performed, new developments and new policies are put in place that make the 
forthcoming analysis seem dated, if not obsolete. A consequence of that is that as 
analysis follows the pace of day-to-day commentary, very little space and 
attention is allocated to a substantive analytical discussion, as opposed to a 
journalistic debate conducted in blogs and newspaper websites, of the issues at 
hand.  
The papers included in this special volume of GreeSE Papers unavoidably suffer 
from the first of these caveats. Although the papers were all written in the last 
few months, some of the issues they examine seem to fast become "yesterday's 
news". Reflecting however on the second caveat, we feel that the publication of 
these papers still makes an important contribution and is thus not only necessary 
but also very timely. What is more, although the papers were written 
independently, they seem to complement each other in a very constructive way.  
The first paper, by Matsaganis and Leventi, examines the logic and distributional 
consequences of the austerity measures implemented since 2010. Based on a 
micro-simulation analysis, the authors examine how the rise in direct and indirect 
taxation and the public sector pay-cuts affect the rates of poverty and the levels 
of inequality in the country. The paper does not provide a normative set of policy 
recommendations but, at least implicitly, makes the case for a more careful and 
socially sensitive design of measures aiming at fiscal consolidation. It is rather 
unfortunate that the news that came out of last weekend’s Eurogroup meeting, 
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about a new austerity package to be negotiated before the end of the summer, do 
not seem to move to this direction but rather to build on the June 2011 Medium-
term Programme which provided for a clearly regressive lowering of the non-
taxable income threshold and rise in taxation for basic goods. 
The second paper, by the current author, shifts the focus to the geographical and 
developmental implications of the austerity measures. Through a compositional 
analysis the paper alerts the reader to the fact that seemingly horizontal measures 
can have very heterogeneous effects across space; and that under certain 
conditions this can generate a pattern of cumulative divergence which can 
compromise future growth and socio-spatial cohesion in the country. The paper 
takes a more prescriptive approach and calls for a different design of policy, 
which will seek to combine the necessary austerity measures for fiscal 
consolidation with a pro-growth and spatially equitable strategy. Quite naturally, 
such a strategy will have to rely on an external stimulus, likely to be provided by 
the European Investment Bank and the EU's Cohesion Fund. The very recent 
developments at the EU level, with Commission President Mr Barroso pushing 
exactly for such a strategy1 (although, quite disappointingly, with the Greek 
government still not fully appreciating and seizing the opportunity), may be seen 
as a vindication of this policy proposal.  
The third paper, by Christodoulakis, takes a more macro-economic view but 
remains very much focused on the austerity-recovery discussion. The paper 
examines, under a much-needed analytical approach, the conditions that led to 
spiralling debt despite the relative success with stabilisation and fiscal 
consolidation. It highlights in particular the role played by indecision (and slow 
action), by both Greece and the EU, and how the particular IMF-EU programme 
that was put in place led inevitably to a more-than-anticipated decline in national 
GDP. Although the paper offers an interesting and succinct discussion of the 
                                                 
1
 See http://www.reuters.com/ article/2011/06/21/eu-greece-funds-idUSLDE75K1C420110621. 
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"how we got here" question, we have decided to place it last in the special 
volume by merit of its careful analysis of alternative policy scenaria for a 
successful 'path to recovery' and the concrete policy recommendations that stem 
from it. In them, the importance of a firmly implemented privatisation 
programme stands out, as does the importance of a carefully designed 
architecture for the post-Memorandum fiscal stabilisation efforts.  
We should note that the publication of these papers does not imply an 
endorsement – by the Hellenic Observatory or indeed by the authors of the other 
papers– of the policy proposals stemming from each of the papers. Differences of 
opinion about the relative importance of progressive taxation, spatial 
redistribution, or privatisation may exist to one degree or another. Indeed, there is 
an on-going discussion –among the authors, around the Hellenic Observatory 
(see, in this regard, the recent launch of the HO Blog) and more broadly– about 
these and surrounding issues. As with much else regarding the ever-unfolding 
"Greek crisis", everything is open. Neither the Hellenic Observatory nor the 
authors of the papers included here claim the possession of 'magic solutions' that 
can turn the situation around overnight. But we do hope that this publication, 
with its emphasis on the analytical examination of at least a subset of the issues 
relating to the Greek crisis, will make a visible contribution to the debate about 
what could be labelled as Greece's "slide to austerity" and, hopefully, "glide to 
recovery". Our aim with this special volume is to add to this debate and inform 
policy-making and the wider audiences of this crisis alike, about the policy 
options and policy challenges lying ahead. We are open to –and very much 
welcome– comments, suggestions and criticisms, not least through our blog entry 
at http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/greeceatlse/2011/07/05/greese_special/.   
 
Vassilis Monastiriotis, 6 July 2011 
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The Distributional Impact of the Crisis in Greece 
 Manos Matsaganis and Chrysa Leventi# 
 
Abstract 
The severe economic crisis affecting Greece is widely expected to have a 
significant social impact in terms of greater inequality and increased poverty. We 
provide an early assessment of whether (and to what extent) this is the case. 
More specifically, we distinguish between two inter-related factors: on the one 
hand, the austerity measures taken to reduce fiscal deficits; on the other hand, the 
wider recession. Using the European tax-benefit model EUROMOD we attempt 
to quantify the distributional implications of both. With respect to the austerity 
measures, we focus on the changes introduced in spring 2010 affecting income 
tax, pension benefits and public sector pay. With respect to the wider recession, 
we model the effects of rising unemployment and inflation, as well as of lower 
earnings for self-employed workers and for employees of private firms. In 
simulating the impact of these changes on the distribution of incomes (and in 
estimating how the total burden of the crisis is shared across income groups), we 
take into account tax evasion and benefit non take up. We end by discussing the 
methodological pitfalls and policy implications of our research. 
 
Keywords: Austerity, Greece, inequality, poverty, microsimulation 
JEL classification: C81, H55, I3 
 
 
1. Introduction 
From the beginning of 2010 Greece has been in the throes of a severe financial 
and economic crisis – without doubt, the worst in living memory. After a decade 
of fast growth, the underlying weakness of the Greek economy was made evident 
in October 2009, when the incoming government announced that earlier fiscal 
                                                 
#
 Earlier versions of this work were presented at various conferences and seminars held from November 
2010 to May 2011 in Athens, Patras, Herakleion, Volos and Modena. We thank participants for their 
reaction. We are also grateful for comments and/or practical assistance to Andre Decoster, Francesco 
Figari, Stelios Katranides, Kostas Manios, Daniela Mantovani, Maggie Minoglou, George Ntouros, Alari 
Paulus, Isaak Sampethai, Holly Sutherland, Platon Tinios, Panos Tsakloglou and Dirk Verwerft. We are 
particularly indebted to Vassilis Monastiriotis for detailed suggestions. Financial support from our 
university through the Basic Research Funding Programme (contract no. EP-1710-12) is gratefully 
acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.  
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data had been misreported. The fiscal deficit and public debt estimates for 2009 
were radically revised2. Financial markets reacted by increasing spreads on 
Greek bonds and by lowering credit ratings (Meghir et al. 2010, Featherstone 
2011). 
In an effort to bring public finances back under control, the government 
announced a first round of austerity measures in March 2010, followed by tax 
reform in April 2010. When these failed to placate the markets, in May 2010 the 
government negotiated an unprecedented €110 billion rescue package with the 
EU, the ECB and the IMF. In return for the rescue package, the government 
signed up to a three-year Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, 
which commits the Greek government to sweeping spending cuts and revenue 
increases (IMF 2010). At the same time, a second round of austerity measures 
was also announced. 
Under the terms of the austerity measures, public sector pay and pension benefits 
were cut. Nominal reductions were compounded by rising inflation, caused by 
VAT hikes as well as rising oil prices internationally and product market 
rigidities domestically. In the context of tax reform, the government changed the 
schedule of personal income tax, raised the top rate and announced a clampdown 
on tax evasion. The measures took place when the Greek economy was already in 
recession, and made it deeper still. After a negative growth (-2.0%) in 2009, GDP 
shrank by a further 4.5% in real terms in 2010. As a result, jobs and wages in the 
private sector suffered considerably. The estimated reduction in employee 
compensation in private firms outside banking in 2010 was 7.3% on average in 
real terms, while the official unemployment rate was forecast to climb to 14.6% 
in 2011 (from 7.7% in 2008). Furthermore, self-employment earnings have also 
been affected. 
                                                 
2
 Deficit and debt projections have been revised from 3.7% to 15.4% of GDP and from 99.6% and to 
126.8% of GDP respectively (Bank of Greece 2011). 
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The crisis (taken here to signify both austerity measures and the economic 
recession) are widely expected to cause poverty and inequality to rise. However, 
predicting the distributional effects of the crisis is not as straightforward as it 
may appear at first sight. Its consequences on the most vulnerable individuals 
may vary substantially, depending on the interaction between their labour market 
participation, the income and employment status of other household members, 
and the capacity of the tax-benefit system to absorb macroeconomic shocks 
(Atkinson 2009, Nolan 2009). 
In this paper we provide an early assessment of whether (and to what extent) this 
is the case. Specifically, we attempt to quantify the distributional implications of 
the crisis using the European tax-benefit model EUROMOD. The paper’s 
structure is as follows. Section 2 introduces the austerity measures and wider 
changes in incomes and employment. Section 3 discusses the various 
methodological issues. Section 4 presents our tentative estimates of the 
distributional effects of the crisis. Section 5 reflects on the policy implications of 
our findings, on the limitations of our approach and on issues for further 
research. 
 
2. The Crisis 
The focus of this paper is on changes in the income distribution in 2010 (the year 
of austerity measures and the bailout package) relative to 2009 (the last year 
before the onset of the crisis). This is not to say that the effects of the crisis were 
limited to the year 2010. At the time of writing (June 2011), the economy 
showed no signs of recovery as GDP fell once again and unemployment 
continued to rise, while a further round of austerity measures was being debated 
in Parliament under the terms of the Medium-Term Fiscal Plan (2012-2015) 
negotiated with the EU, the ECB and the IMF. The impact of more recent 
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developments on the distribution of incomes in 2011 falls outside the scope of 
the current paper, but is the subject of ongoing research. 
For analytical purposes, the paper distinguishes between austerity measures and 
the wider recession. This distinction is to some extent artificial. For example, the 
fact that the incomes of civil servants and pensioners were cut contributed to 
lowering the demand for goods and services provided by private firms, as a result 
of which private sector workers’ wages and self-employment earnings declined, 
while unemployment rose. In making the distinction we take no position on the 
debate as to whether the Greek economy would have been in recession in the 
absence of the austerity measures. Where we refer to the effects of austerity 
measures we imply first-order rather than full effects (i.e. excluding those 
mediated by the recession). 
In the above spirit, the term “austerity measures” covers policies introduced by 
the government in an attempt to reduce fiscal deficits, either under the provisions 
or in the context of the Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies agreed 
with the EU, the ECB and the IMF in May 2010. In contrast, the wider recession 
indicates other changes in the economy, not directly under the government’s 
control, such as those affecting jobs and wages in private firms. 
 
2.1 The austerity 
Specifically, the austerity measures of spring 2010 were a combination of 
increases in indirect taxes, introduction of new direct taxes, personal income tax 
reform, cuts in public sector pay and in pensions. Later in the year, the fiscal 
squeeze affected other social benefits and public services. 
 9 
 
Public sector pay 
Until recently, wages and salaries in Greece (in the public as well as in the 
private sector) were paid in 14 monthly instalments. In 2010, the 13th and 14th 
salaries paid to civil servants and public utilities employees were abolished. In 
their place, flat-rate vacation allowances totalling €1,000 a year were introduced 
for public sector workers earning less than €3,000 per month. Moreover, special 
allowances paid to civil servants3 were reduced by 20%. Public utilities 
employees, whose special allowances other than family allowances are part of 
base pay, had the latter cut by 10%. Public sector salaries were frozen at their 
2009 level and capped at €5,981 a month. As a result of the above, average gross 
earnings in 2010 declined in real terms relative to 2009 by an estimated 13.6% 
for civil servants and 9.7% for workers in public enterprises (Bank of Greece 
2011). 
Indirect taxation 
The standard rate of VAT was raised from 19% to 23% in two steps between 
March and May 2010. Base and reduced rates were also increased from 4.5% to 
5.5% and from 9% to 11% respectively. Other indirect taxes also went up: excise 
duty on tobacco, alcohol and fuel by 30%, taxes on luxury items by 20%. 
Direct taxation 
Personal income tax was restructured in April 2010. The new schedule is rather 
more progressive (with 9 tax bands instead of 5), and provides for a personal tax 
allowance of €12,000 per year and a higher top rate of 45% (for annual incomes 
over €100,000). Moreover, the tax base was extended to include unemployment 
benefits, large family benefits and non contributory disability benefits, when 
taxable income exceeds €30,000 a year. Various tax allowances and credits were 
                                                 
3
 Family allowances, and extra allowances for seniority, post-graduate studies and in case of hard and 
arduous occupation, were not affected by the cuts. 
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also revised. Also, personal incomes over €100,000 in 2009 were made subject to 
a one-off emergency tax at 1%, while a similar (and much resented) tax was 
retrospectively levied on firms who had registered large profits in 2009. 
Pensioners’ solidarity contribution 
A special levy on pension incomes (labelled “Pensioners’ solidarity 
contribution”) was introduced in May 2010. Pensions under €1,400 per month 
were exempted. Above that level, tax rates rise steeply from 3% to 10% (the 
latter applies to pensions over €3,500 a month). 
Pension benefits4 
Retirement pensions in Greece also used to be payable in 14 monthly 
instalments. The 13th and 14th pensions have now been abolished5, replaced by 
flat-rate vacation allowances totalling €800 a year (payable only to pensioners 
aged over 60 receiving a pension below €2,500 per month). Pensions were also 
frozen at their 2009 level. 
Social benefits 
Funding cuts, in some cases aggravated by a significant drop in social insurance 
organisations’ income from contributions, undermined the regular payment of 
social benefits. In one instance (OEK rent benefit for private sector employees, 
the main housing benefit in Greece), payment of benefit was entirely suspended 
for 2010. In another instance (pensioners social solidarity supplement ΕΚΑΣ), 
the effort to weed out ineligible claimants intensified, with the inevitable result 
that some eligible recipients had their benefit suspended. 
                                                 
4
 The pension reform law, approved by Parliament in July 2010, is not discussed here, as its effects on 
pension incomes will be felt in future years. For more information and an analysis, see Matsaganis & 
Leventi (2011). 
5
 Invalidity pensions, social pensions and farmer basic pensions were exempted. 
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Public services 
As a result of the fiscal squeeze, health and personal social services (such as 
child care and social care for the elderly), as well as education, have also suffered 
funding cuts, which to some extent have affected the quantity and quality of 
services provided. 
Labour law 
Finally, changes in labour law allowed collective agreements at industry- and 
firm-level to set lower wages than those agreed under the National General 
Collective Wage Agreement, while entry wages below the statutory minimum 
were introduced for workers aged below 21. 
 
2.2 The recession 
In 2010 the Greek economy plunged into deep recession (GDP growth -4.5% 
compared to -2.0% the year before). The most significant developments were as 
follows: 
Unemployment 
The overall unemployment rate has risen sharply from 7.7% in 2008 (and 9.5% 
in 2009), to 12.5% in 2010 (and a forecast 14.6% in 2011). Until very recently, 
labour market institutions and norms in Greece appeared to favour primary 
earners, especially male breadwinners, at the expense of secondary earners. For 
instance, unemployment among men aged 30-44 in 2008 was a mere 3.9%, while 
for women aged 20-29 it was as high as 20.5%. One implication of the traditional 
pattern was that unemployment and poverty rarely overlapped, affecting different 
population groups. 
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As a result of the current crisis, unemployment has risen across the board: to 
8.2% for men aged 30-44 and to 29.0% for women aged 20-29 in 2010. The 
significant rise in unemployment among primary earners introduces a new 
pattern, more reminiscent of that in western and northern Europe. It also 
constitutes prima facie evidence that the unemployed (especially households with 
unemployed head) account for a higher share of the population in poverty. We 
will return to this point later on in the paper. 
Private sector wages 
In 2010 average gross earnings in private firms declined in real terms, relative to 
2009, by an estimated 6.2%% in banking and by 7.3% outside banking (Bank of 
Greece 2011). 
Business closures 
An unknown number of small businesses had to close as a result of the recession. 
Also, some larger employers, mostly in light manufacture and typically in North 
Greece, relocated to other Balkan countries where labour costs and taxes are 
lower. 
Self-employed earnings 
Many more small businesses stayed afloat, muddling through even though trade 
was less than brisk. As a result, earnings from self-employment (including the 
more prestigious “liberal professions” of medical doctors, engineers and lawyers) 
were lower than before the recession. 
Inflation 
In spite of the recession, VAT hikes plus rising oil prices abroad and product 
market rigidities at home caused the harmonised Consumer Price Index to rise to 
4.7% in 2010 (from 1.4% in 2009). 
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3. Methodology 
Our analysis makes use of EUROMOD, a multi-country tax-benefit 
microsimulation model that provides measures of direct taxes, social 
contributions, cash benefits and market incomes in a comparable way across EU 
member states. EUROMOD simulates non-contributory cash benefit 
entitlements, direct tax and social insurance contribution liabilities on the basis of 
the tax-benefit rules in place and information available in the underlying datasets. 
The components of the tax-benefit systems that cannot be simulated (e.g. those 
depending on prior contributions) are taken from the data along with information 
on original incomes6. Baseline systems in EUROMOD have been validated at 
micro level (i.e. case-by-case validation), as well as at macro level (Figari, 
Iacovou, Skew & Sutherland 2010). Furthermore, the model has been tested in 
numerous applications (e.g. Bargain 2006). 
EUROMOD enables us to compute the disposable income of individuals under 
different scenarios, taking account of the operation of tax-benefit systems and the 
way these interact with market incomes and personal/household characteristics. 
In this paper, the underlying micro data for Greece are provided by both the 
European (UDB) and the national (PDB) version7 of EU-SILC 2007. The use of 
the national version allows us to exploit all information collected in the national 
questionnaires, which is closer to the level of detail required for accurate tax and 
benefit simulations. 
Estimating the effects of the crisis on the income distribution in 2010 using a 
dataset (EU-SILC 2007) originally reporting incomes earned in 2006 is clearly 
unsatisfactory. Due to the complexity of income surveys (including those - like 
EU-SILC - specifically designed to provide prompt information), income data 
                                                 
6
 For further information see Sutherland (2007) and Lietz & Mantovani (2007). EUROMOD is currently 
undergoing a major updating process. The aim is to have EUROMOD run on EU-SILC in all EU-27 
member states by 2012. 
7
 We are grateful to El.Stat., and especially to George Ntouros, for providing us with the data of the 
national version of EU-SILC. 
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only become available after considerable delay. For instance, the EU-SILC 2011 
survey data (reporting incomes earned in 2010) will not be released before March 
2013 (cross-sectional component) and August 2013 (longitudinal component). 
A tax-benefit model like EUROMOD can fill the gap, providing timely estimates 
of the effects of the crisis on the income distribution. To do so, it is necessary to 
update the model to 2010. This involves three separate steps: (a) updating tax and 
benefit policies, (b) uprating incomes, and (c) accounting for changes in the 
characteristics of the population, namely the rise in unemployment. 
Furthermore, EUROMOD, in common with most tax-benefit models, works 
under the default assumption of full compliance (i.e. that tax and benefit rules are 
fully adhered to). This is an obvious oversimplification - most clearly so when 
tax evasion and non-take up of benefits are present. In order to enhance the 
accuracy and credibility of our estimates, we have addressed tax evasion and 
benefit non take up. 
Other issues we have also considered concern indirect taxation and benefits in 
kind. A final issue concerns the choice of the poverty and inequality indicators 
we used to assess distributional effects. Below we explain how we dealt with the 
above issues in turn. 
Updating tax and benefit policies 
We simulated the tax-benefit system of Greece for every single year from 2006 
to 2010. In particular, we directly simulated as many of the policy changes 
described in section 2 as was possible. These changes included cuts in public 
pensions via the elimination of the 13th and 14th monthly payments, their 
replacement by pensioners’ vacation allowances, the introduction of pensioners’ 
solidarity contribution, the new personal income tax schedule, the 1% one-off 
emergency tax on high incomes, the extension of the tax base, and most changes 
in tax credits and allowances (e.g. changes in tax relief for dependent children, 
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for installation of eco-friendly power systems, and for private insurance 
contributions). 
Furthermore, we took full account of the fact that provision of OEK rent subsidy, 
a contributory income-tested housing benefit for dependent workers, was 
suspended in 2010. 
Uprating incomes 
We separately modelled the fall in earnings suffered by different groups of 
workers. We accounted for the cuts in public sector pay by uprating civil 
servants’ and public utility workers’ incomes from dependent employment on the 
basis of the latest estimates of average rates of income growth provided by the 
Bank of Greece. With respect to changes in private sector wages, we used the 
average rates of growth in the relevant incomes over the relevant period (from 
2006 to 2010), separately for banking and non-banking firms, as estimated by the 
Bank of Greece (2011). Farmers’ earnings were uprated on the basis of data on 
gross value added by industry provided by El.Stat. As regards self-employment 
earnings, no reliable information is available on recent changes. In view of that, 
we assumed that incomes from self-employment moved in tandem with incomes 
from dependent employment (i.e. -5%)8. We uprated all other market incomes 
(such as property incomes, investment incomes and the like) on the basis of the 
most reliable information available. All uprating factors can be seen in the 
Appendix (Table A.1)9. 
                                                 
8
 Later in the paper, we discuss the impact of assuming that the reduction in self-employment earnings 
was twice as large as the reduction in income from dependent employment, i.e. -10% rather than -5% (see 
section 4). 
9
 Note that the nominal rates of income growth shown in Table A.1 are exactly equivalent to the real rates 
reported in section 2. 
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Accounting for the rise in unemployment 
Standard practice in microsimulation is simply to ignore changes in the 
demographic composition or in the labour market characteristics of the relevant 
population. This is less unwise than it may seem, since such changes are likely to 
be negligible in the short term over which policy changes are typically assessed. 
Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the rise in unemployment in recent years in 
Greece, from 8.3% in the data year (2007) to 12.5% in the year of interest (2010), 
assuming away such a change would clearly have been inappropriate for this 
paper. 
We accounted for the rise in unemployment by changing the employment status 
of the required number of cases in the dataset. In other words, our approach 
draws on Figari, Salvatori & Sutherland (2010)10. Specifically, we first identified 
the relevant sub-sample (workers in dependent employment other than tenured 
civil servants; self-employed workers were also excluded). Then we split the sub-
sample into 56 groups defined by gender, age and education. Furthermore, we 
moved a number of cases within each group from employment to unemployment 
in order to replicate as closely as possible the pattern of unemployment shown in 
the 2010 Labour Force Survey11. The earnings from dependent employment of 
those made unemployed in the dataset were set to zero. Some of these workers 
(depending on their previous employment record) would be eligible for 
unemployment benefit, which we simulated. Finally, we assumed no changes in 
labour supply. The resulting adjustment is shown in Table A.2. 
An alternative way to deal with changes in employment status might have been 
to re-weight the EU-SILC sample by increasing the weights of households 
containing unemployed workers at the time of the survey, while at the same time 
reducing the weights of other households so as to keep constant the composition 
                                                 
10
 For a similar technique, see Baldini & Ciani (2010). 
11
 Unlike income surveys, labour force surveys usually release data within two or three months from 
collection. 
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of the dataset (Immervoll et al. 2006). The drawback with that approach is that 
re-weighting would amount to implicitly assuming that the characteristics of 
those losing their job at the onset of the crisis are similar to those already 
unemployed at the time of the survey. In the case of Greece this can be quite 
misleading, as all available evidence indicates that the characteristics of those 
made unemployed in 2010 are quite different from the characteristics of those 
made unemployed in earlier years. 
Accounting for tax evasion 
Under-reporting of personal incomes for the purposes of tax evasion is known to 
be rife in Greece (OECD 2009). As a consequence, to ignore tax evasion when 
estimating the distributional impact of the crisis would be seriously to undermine 
the validity of our results. By assumption, and building on the findings of an 
earlier study of tax evasion in 2004 (Matsaganis & Flevotomou 2010)12, we 
introduce rates of under-reporting equal to 1% for salaries and wages, 0% for 
public pensions, 25% for self-employment earnings and 55% for farming 
incomes (see Table A.3). 
In accounting for tax evasion in EUROMOD we assume that individuals reveal 
their real total net income (say N) to survey interviewers (in this case, EU-SILC). 
Let G denote individuals’ real gross income (which includes the part of income 
which is not reported to the tax authorities), and r the rate of income under-
reporting. Further, let T(G) denote the personal income tax function. In the 
presence of tax evasion, it follows that:  
G = N + T((1-r)* G)) 
                                                 
12
 We implicitly assume that patterns of income under-reporting for tax evasion did not change between 
2004 and 2010. As a matter of fact, it is widely thought that tax evasion intensified under conservative 
rule (2004-2009), and that was kept in check in 2010 as the incoming socialist government made 
threatening noises against suspected tax evaders. However, no hard evidence exists on the real extent of 
tax evasion in recent years. We are currently involved in on-going research analysing a large panel of 
income tax returns since 2005. 
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By solving this recursive problem iteratively13 and for each income source 
separately, we obtain the values of real gross income, G. The rates of under-
reporting are then used to separate the reported from the unreported part of gross 
income. EUROMOD treats the former as subject to income tax and social 
insurance contributions (and as used in resource assessment for means-tested 
benefits), while it adds the latter to individuals’ disposable income. 
Accounting for benefit non take up 
EUROMOD by default assumes full benefit take up. However, not all social 
benefits are claimed by those eligible. Recent evidence shows that the extent of 
non-take up in many countries (including Greece) is considerable14. 
In this paper, correction for non-take up was carried out for two income-tested 
benefits: social pension, aimed for non-recipients of a contributory pension aged 
over 65; and unemployment assistance for older workers, targeted at the long-
term unemployed on low income. 
In the former case, the social pension was only assigned to people who declared 
receipt in the original dataset (part simulation). Regarding unemployment 
assistance for older workers, the benefit was randomly assigned to 5% of eligible 
recipients15 (see Table A.4). 
Accounting for indirect taxation 
We could not directly account for VAT changes, as the underlying dataset does 
not include information on consumption patterns (EU-SILC is not an expenditure 
survey). To provide an indirect measure of the incidence of VAT hikes, we 
                                                 
13
 We thank Kostas Manios for providing us with the relevant code. 
14
 For a recent analysis of non-take up in Greece and in Spain, see Matsaganis et al. (2010). For a review 
of non-take up in several other EU countries, see Matsaganis et al. (2008). 
15
 In the original EU-SILC dataset, eligibility rules for unemployment assistance for older workers (under 
the assumption of full take up) appeared to be met in 38 cases, whereas receipt was reported by only 2. 
The latter, projected from the sample to the population, is roughly equivalent to the known number of 
actual recipients from administrative data. The implicit non take up rate (2/38) is approximately equal to 
5%. 
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applied the methodology established in earlier work (Decoster et al. 2010), using 
data from the 2004 Household Budget Survey16. We were thus able to 
incorporate - albeit indirectly - VAT increases in our analysis of the relative 
contribution of each austerity measure to overall fiscal consolidation, and of their 
incidence by income quantile (Figure 3). Nevertheless, we were unable to 
account for the distributional effects of changes in VAT rates elsewhere in the 
paper. 
(Not) accounting for benefits in kind 
A significant aspect of the austerity is that the fiscal squeeze may affect the 
quality and quantity of public services. Capturing the distributional impact of 
social benefits in kind is not a common feature of most tax-benefit models. In 
spite of the substantial progress made recently towards incorporating non-
monetary components into EUROMOD (see Paulus et al. 2010), the relevant 
module is not yet generally available. In view of the above, changes in the 
provision of social benefits in kind (such as publicly-funded health care, 
education, care for the elderly, child care and so on) are ignored in this paper. 
Inequality indicators 
To assess inequality effects we use three indicators. The first is the Gini 
coefficient, probably the widest used inequality indicator, taking values ranging 
from 0 (total equality) to 1 (max. inequality). The second inequality indicator is 
the coefficient of variation, a measure of income dispersion (Duclos & Araar 
2006). The third indicator is the S80/S20 income quintile share ratio, measuring 
the (equivalised disposable) income received by the richest 20% of the 
population divided by that received by the poorest 20% of the population17. 
                                                 
16
 We thank Dirk Verwerft (University of Leuven) for simulating for us the recent VAT changes in 
Greece. 
17
 In the terminology of the European Commission, the S80/S20 income quintile share ratio is a structural 
indicator (key indicator 12) and an OMC indicator. The latter are “instruments for monitoring the 
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Poverty indicators 
To assess poverty effects we use three so-called Laeken poverty indicators 
(Atkinson et al. 2002). The first indicator is the standard poverty rate, measured 
in terms of the proportion of the population with an equivalised income below 
60% of the median equivalised disposable income18. The second indicator may 
be termed the extreme poverty rate, measured in terms of the proportion of the 
population with an equivalised income below 40% of the median equivalised 
disposable income. 
Both of the above indicators measure poverty by reference to a poverty line that 
is a function of median incomes. In other words, it goes up as median incomes 
improve, and it goes down as median incomes fall. This is quite consistent with 
the concept of “relative poverty”, and may not matter much when income growth 
is slow either way. Nevertheless, at times of rapid change in living standards, 
individuals may compare their condition not so much with that of “the average 
person” in the society in which they live, but with their own condition in a 
previous period. 
In view of that, it may be more appropriate to use an indicator measuring poverty 
by reference to a poverty threshold anchored at a fixed moment in time. 
Accordingly, our third indicator reports the proportion of population with 
equivalised income in 2010 below 60% of the median of the 2009 distribution, 
adjusted for inflation19. By introducing this indicator, we classify as poor all 
those with income above the standard poverty threshold in 2010, but with 
purchasing power below the standard poverty threshold of 2009. In other words, 
we try to capture the experience of those unable to purchase in 2010 the goods 
                                                                                                                                               
overarching objectives within the Open Method of Coordination on social protection and social 
inclusion”. See EC (2010). 
18
 The standard poverty rate (At-risk-of-poverty rate after social transfers) is a structural indicator (key 
indicator 13b) and an OMC indicator. 
19
 The proportion of population with equivalised income in 2010 below 60% of the median of the 2009 
distribution, adjusted for inflation, is a specification of another OMC indicator (At-risk-of-poverty rate 
anchored at a fixed moment in time). 
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and services which were affordable to someone with income exactly equal to the 
poverty threshold in 2009. Arguably, a poverty threshold anchored at a fixed 
moment in time is better suited to periods of rapid change in living standards. In 
this sense, our third indicator may be thought better to approximate the 
experience of impoverishment when nominal incomes fall and prices rise. 
 
4. Results 
What were the effects of the 2010 austerity measures and the wider recession on 
the income distribution? Did they cause inequality and poverty to rise? How 
equitably was the burden of the crisis shared between income groups? In this 
section we attempt to provide some tentative answers to these questions. 
Inequality effects 
The estimated effect of austerity measures and the recession on income 
inequality is shown in Table 1. On two out of the three indices we selected, 
inequality seems to have increased. In the case of the Gini index, the increase is a 
mere 0.05%. In terms of the S80/S20 index, the income share of the richest 20% 
of the population appears to have risen (relative to that of the poorest 20%) from 
6.11 in 2009 to 6.19 in 2010, or by 1.4%. On the contrary, the coefficient of 
variation seems to have actually declined by 1.7%, implying that the distribution 
of disposable income in 2010 became somewhat less dispersed relative to 2009 
(i.e. pre-crisis). 
Figure 1 offers a visual representation of changes in relative income share by 
decile. It can be seen that the two poorest deciles actually lost ground in relative 
terms, even though as a proportion of total disposable income their loss was 
small (less than 0.1%). The greatest loss was suffered by the top decile (from 
26.8% to 26.5% of total income). Otherwise, income deciles 5-9 seem to have 
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improved their position a little. On the whole, changes in relative income share 
were rather limited. 
Poverty effects  
Tables 2-4 show how our three poverty indicators were affected by the crisis. 
Results are shown by age and by employment status of the household head20. 
Using the standard poverty line (at 60% of median), the overall poverty rate 
seems to have risen a little: from 20.1% in 2009 to 20.9% in 2010. Looking at 
effects on specific population sub-groups, poverty rates vary widely; from nearly 
0% for households whose head worked in the public or banking sector, to over 
40% for households whose head was unemployed or a farmer. Households with 
an unemployed head appeared to be worst hit by the crisis: their poverty rate 
went up by 9 percentage points (from 51.1% to 60.1%). With respect to age, the 
rise in poverty was more pronounced for persons aged 30-44, the age group 
worst affected by the rise in unemployment (see Table 2).  
With reference to a lower poverty standard at 40% of median equivalised 
disposable incomes, our results reveal a similar pattern: overall poverty increased 
from 7.3% in 2009 to 8.0% in 2010 (Table 3). In the case of households with an 
unemployed head, the extreme poverty rate reached 38.5% (from 34.8% in 
2009). 
Using a poverty threshold anchored at a fixed moment in time (at 60% of the 
median of the 2009 distribution, adjusted for inflation), alters results quite 
drastically (Table 4). Overall poverty rises by more than 5 percentage points to 
25.5%. The increase is pronounced for all age groups and for most occupational 
                                                 
20
 Household head is defined as the person owning or renting the household’s dwelling. If two or more 
persons share this responsibility, the head of household is the person with the highest disposable income. 
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categories. Once again, households whose head was unemployed21 fared worst, 
experiencing an increase in their poverty risk from an already very high 51.1% in 
2009 to 63.7% in 2010. 
By way of a quasi-sensitivity analysis, we tested the impact of assuming that the 
drop in self-employment earnings was twice as large as initially assumed, i.e. -
10% rather than -5%. Recall that, as discussed in section 3, no reliable data on 
recent changes in such earnings are available yet. By reference to a poverty line 
at 60% of median incomes, the poverty rate rose from 20.9% to 21.0%. By 
reference to a poverty line at 40% of median incomes, the poverty rate went up 
by another half percentage point, from 8.0% to 8.1%. Using a poverty line 
anchored at its 2009 level and adjusted for inflation caused the poverty rate to 
rise more markedly from 25.5% to 26.0%. On this evidence, our results seemed 
rather robust22. 
Income loss 
Figure 2 presents our estimates of the effects of the crisis by income decile, both 
in absolute terms (in equivalised euros per year, in 2009 prices) and in relative 
terms (as a proportion of each decile’s disposable income in 2009, adjusted for 
inflation). Note that our estimates focus on income alone, i.e. the effects of 
changes in indirect taxation are ignored. Note also that the composition of 
income deciles has been fixed in pre-crisis terms, i.e. individuals were ranked 
according to their equivalised disposable income in 2009. 
In absolute terms, a rather steep gradient can be observed. Households in the top 
decile appear to have lost €4,344 per year per “equivalent adult” in 2009 prices 
(i.e. as much as €9,122 per year for a couple with two children). By contrast, 
                                                 
21
 Note that following the adjustment to the dataset described in section 3, the population share of 
households headed by unemployed workers rose from 2.0% in 2009 to 3.4% in 2010. 
22
 We also experimented with excluding from our analysis the effects of one-off measures, such as the 1% 
emergency tax on high incomes described in section 2; this made no difference whatsoever to our results. 
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those in the poorest decile were left €313 worse off (€657 per year for a family of 
four). 
However, in relative terms the pattern of income loss looked a lot less 
progressive. Households in the poorest decile lost an estimated 8.7% of their 
income; those in the next poorest decile 8.6%. Around the middle of the 
distribution (deciles 3-7), relative income loss fluctuated around 9.5%. Further 
up, income loss reached 10.1% (decile 8), and peaked at 11.6% for households in 
the richest decile. 
 
The burden of austerity 
We now turn to a crucial (and politically contested) question: how was the 
burden of austerity shared between income groups? Figure 3 shows the relative 
contribution of the main austerity measures (including increases in VAT rates) to 
the Greek government’s overall fiscal consolidation effort, by income decile, as a 
proportion of total savings. 
An important finding, at first surprising, is that cuts in public sector pay and 
pension benefits were almost exactly offset by increased spending on 
unemployment benefits and lower income tax proceeds. The most effective (in 
terms of contribution to fiscal consolidation) of all the austerity measures, and 
the one to have made a difference, is the increase in VAT rates. 
In distributional terms, a significant factor is the actual design of each measure. 
For example, pensioners’ solidarity contribution was created with the explicit 
aim of placing a much higher burden on high pension than on low ones23. It can 
be clearly seen that this was achieved, since this measure hardly affected anyone 
                                                 
23
 The estimated contribution of the top three deciles to total savings from the introduction of pensioners’ 
solidarity contribution is estimated at 78%. The richest decile alone accounted for 45% of total savings 
from this policy measure. 
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in the bottom half of the income distribution. To a lesser extent, this is also the 
case with cuts in pension benefits24. 
Furthermore, much also depends on the income position of those affected by 
each measure. For instance, most public sector workers tend to be located 
towards the top of the income distribution. In fact, further analysis confirms that 
74% of civil servants and 65% of public utility workers were located in the top 
30% of the income distribution (Table A.5). As a result of that, even assuming a 
proportional reduction in public sector pay (as we do here), the top 30% of the 
income distribution provided an estimated 84% of the total fiscal savings from 
cuts in public sector pay25. 
Paradoxically, in spite of the changes in the structure of personal income tax, 
three factors combined to make the changes less effective (in terms of tax 
proceeds) and at the same time less progressive (in terms of distributional 
effects). The austerity reduces the taxable incomes of public sector workers and 
pensioners. The recession reduces other taxable incomes (i.e. wages and salaries 
of private sector employees and earnings of own account workers and the liberal 
professions). Tax evasion places a significant share of real incomes from farming 
and self-employment beyond the control of the tax system, distorting the latter’s 
intended distributional effect. 
Redistributive effects of each austerity measure can be more formally assessed 
by calculating the values of index of residual progression proposed by Reynolds 
and Smolensky (1977). The index shows the difference between the actual value 
of the Gini coefficient and its counterfactual value in the absence of changes in 
the policy being assessed, keeping all other effects constant (see also Duclos and 
Araar 2006). The results are shown in Table 5. 
                                                 
24
 We estimated that 53% of the total savings from cuts in public pensions concerned the top three deciles. 
In contrast, the bottom three deciles accounted for 7% of the relevant savings. 
25
 Own calculations, available on request. 
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The values of the Reynolds-Smolensky index confirm that the redistributive 
effect of cuts in public sector pay was considerably progressive. Moreover, 
changes in personal income tax and the introduction of pensioners’ solidarity 
contribution also seem to have been (mildly) progressive. On the other hand, the 
redistributive effect of cuts in pension benefits was shown to be weakly 
regressive. 
VAT changes (analysed separately) have been unambiguously regressive26. In 
spite of the fact that different rates may apply to different expenditure items (as is 
the case with VAT in Greece), the structure of all indirect taxes remains largely 
proportional. Moreover, as income falls the propensity to consume tends to rise, 
exceeding 1 at low incomes (where families spend more than they earn, either by 
borrowing or by drawing on past savings). As a result of both, poor households 
contribute a significant proportion of the total tax take, which amounts to a very 
high proportion of their own income. 
On the whole, the rich appear to have shouldered most of the burden of the fiscal 
consolidation effort: those in the top decile contributed 21.5% of total savings; 
those in the next richest decile 14.3%. Nonetheless, the contribution of lower 
incomes was far from negligible: those in the bottom decile accounted for 4.3% 
of total savings; those in the next poorest decile for 6.1%. Since the relative 
income share of the two lowest income deciles was respectively 2.5% and 4.3% 
(and leaving for a moment aside the objection that our estimate of the impact of 
VAT changes is imperfect), we can conclude that the poor contributed a clearly 
greater proportion of their income than the rich to the government’s fiscal 
consolidation effort. 
                                                 
26
 Specifically, the bottom three deciles contributed 18.5% of the total savings from VAT rate increases. 
The poorest decile alone accounted for 5% of total savings. Further analysis, based on data from the 2004 
Household Budget Survey (results available on request), shows that the increase in VAT corresponded to 
around 2.5% of each decile’s total consumption expenditure across the distribution. On the contrary, as a 
proportion of each decile’s disposable income it ranged from 2.5% for the richest decile to 6.5% for the 
poorest decile, rising monotonically as income fell. 
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5. Concluding remarks 
Our results can be summarized as follows. As a result of the austerity measures 
and the wider recession in Greece, relative poverty (as measured conventionally, 
by reference to a poverty threshold of 60% of median incomes) has increased 
from 20.1% in 2009 to 20.9% to 2010. Extreme poverty (measured by reference 
to a threshold of 40% of median incomes) has followed a similar pattern, rising 
from 7.3% to 8.0%. While these increases may appear unimpressive, poverty was 
shown to have risen to 25.5% if anchored in pre-crisis terms (measured by 
reference to a threshold of 60% of median incomes in 2009, adjusted for 
inflation). We argue that the latter indicator is better suited to periods of rapid 
change in living standards, better approximating the experience of 
impoverishment when nominal incomes fall and prices rise (as was the case in 
Greece in 2010 relative to 2009). 
Looking at poverty by category, the situation of households headed by 
unemployed workers emerges as clearly alarming. On the one hand, because of 
the sharp rise in unemployment among primary earners, the relative weight of 
such households in the population has increased considerably. On the other hand, 
the risk of poverty within this group has risen further: of all individuals living in 
a household whose head was unemployed, 38.5% had an income of less than 
40% of median, while the proportion of those with income below 60% of median 
was 60.1%! 
Taking into account that the maximum duration of unemployment insurance 
benefit is 12 months, that unemployment assistance benefit has narrow eligibility 
conditions and suffers from massive non take up, while the rate of unemployment 
(and of long-term unemployment) is expected to remain high in the immediate 
future, poverty among the unemployed is certain to become the new social 
question par excellence. 
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Changes in inequality were less pronounced, while their general direction was 
rather indeterminate: on the basis of available evidence, we cannot say with any 
degree of safety whether the income distribution in Greece became more or less 
compressed as a result of the crisis. In terms of relative income share, although 
the richest decile appeared to have lost ground, so did the two poorest deciles. 
Income losses were far greater for the rich than for the poor in absolute terms 
(i.e. in euros). However, in relative terms (i.e. as a proportion of their income), 
lower income groups suffered a significant loss of income. For instance, 
households in the bottom quintile (i.e. the poorest 20% of the population) lost an 
estimated 9% of their income, compared to an income loss of 11% for 
households in the top quintile. 
Some of the government’s austerity measures seem to have had a progressive 
effect: either because special care was taken to make a particular policy “fair” by 
design (e.g. changes in income tax, introduction of pensioners’ solidarity 
contribution), or because those most affected were located towards the top of the 
income distribution (e.g. public sector pay cuts). However, this was partly offset 
by the regressive effect (albeit weak) of pension benefits cuts. Taking into 
account VAT rate increases would tilt the balance decisively in the latter 
direction: as a proportion of their income, the poor have contributed more than 
the rich to the government’s fiscal consolidation effort. 
A certain amount of caution is called for when interpreting our results. The main 
issues - to do either with the data we had to rely upon, with our assumptions, or 
with our approach - are briefly discussed below. 
With respect to data, the original database offers an imperfect representation of 
reality. The Greek dataset of EU-SILC 2007 over-samples some population sub-
groups (civil servants, public utility workers, banking employees), while it under-
samples others (the self-employed, farmers, pensioners). If, as is often the case, 
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the former have higher income than the latter, a composition effect arises, with 
the implication that poverty and inequality in the population could be higher than 
in the sample. 
Moreover, uprating incomes from an earlier date to the present amounts to 
assuming that everybody’s income from a given source has risen by the same rate 
over the relevant period. This is clearly unrealistic, and could well understate 
distributional changes. On the other hand, uprating some incomes (e.g. self-
employed earnings, incomes from farming, etc.) is subject to an even greater 
degree of uncertainty. 
On the other hand, the simulation of the tax-benefit system may be imperfect 
when e.g. income tax rules are too complex to be accurately simulated, or when 
eligibility for means-tested benefits depends on income in previous years. 
Furthermore, as discussed earlier, our approach to accounting for tax evasion, 
based on earlier work (Matsaganis & Flevotomou 2010), even though a clear 
improvement over standard practice, remains rather simplistic. Assuming that (a) 
rates of under-reporting have not changed since 2004, that (b) they only vary by 
income source, and (c) that everyone’s income from a given source is under-
reported by the same rate, leaves much to be desired. 
The same holds for the treatment of indirect taxation. In this paper, we have 
drawn on findings from earlier research (Decoster at al. 2010) in order to account 
for the likely impact of VAT changes, albeit in a rather crude manner. This was 
inevitable to some extent, since EU-SILC is not an expenditure survey and 
contains no information on consumption patterns. Nonetheless, given the salience 
of indirect taxes in the Greek tax system, correctly estimating their distributional 
impact would greatly enhance the accuracy of our results. 
On another register, the fiscal squeeze undermines the proper funding of the 
public sector, adversely affecting essential public services and the “social wage”. 
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However, social benefits in-kind (e.g. publicly-funded health care, child care, 
social care, education etc.) are ignored here. This issue has been addressed in 
recent work on incorporating non-monetary components into EUROMOD 
(Paulus et al. 2010). However, we know too little about the actual effect of 
funding cuts on the quality and quantity of social services. While collecting the 
relevant information and relating inputs to outputs is impossible without a 
substantial amount of further research, the gains could also be substantial. 
Although we have made progress towards accounting for the rise in 
unemployment, much remains to be done in order to capture the impact of the 
recession more fully. In particular, we have implicitly assumed that the reduced 
demand for the goods and services provided by the self-employed has resulted in 
loss of earnings but not in loss of jobs. To some extent, this is a reasonable 
assumption: small businesses muddle through even when trade is less than brisk, 
while some of those whose business does fail are not classified as unemployed 
but either as involved in some other activity (e.g. in farming) or as inactive (e.g. 
pensioners). Nevertheless, the assumption that no self-employed worker was 
made unemployed as a result of the crisis seems rather problematic. 
While we are fully aware that these weaknesses affect the accuracy of our results, 
we are confident that our research offers a good approximation of the 
distributional effects of austerity measures and the wider recession in Greece. 
Given the topicality of the questions addressed, and the public interest in the 
answers, we believe that work based on microsimulation is a good alternative to 
waiting until future waves of EU-SILC are released. Furthermore, if the research 
question involves identifying the effect of different factors, distinguishing 
between progressive and regressive items within the same policy package (as is 
the case here), there really is no alternative to micro simulation27. 
                                                 
27
 For a good example of a recent application of microsimulation to estimating the impact of the austerity 
in the UK, see Browne & Levell (2010). 
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Our research is part of collaborative work, involving other European countries as 
well (Leventi et al. 2010). In the immediate future we hope to improve our 
methods, study more countries, and make use of better data as soon as they 
become available. 
In the meantime, our findings show that, in order to share the burden of austerity 
more equitably and to minimise losses for lower income groups, policies to 
reduce Greece’s deficit need to be redesigned. In particular, the importance of 
fighting tax evasion cannot be overstated: it is crucial from a fiscal point of view 
(improving tax collection would help reduce budget deficits), as well as from a 
political point of view (restoring distributional justice would go a long way 
towards making austerity measures more acceptable). 
Quite apart from the effects of the austerity, the wider recession (and, in 
particular, the sharp rise in unemployment) has raised the demand for social 
benefits. So far, the Greek government’s response has been inadequate 
(Matsaganis 2011). Even though the number of unemployed workers rose by 
45.1% in December 2010 compared to the same month a year earlier, the number 
of unemployment benefit recipients over the same period went up by only 9.6%. 
Rather perversely, housing benefit was suspended in 2010, partly because the 
crisis slowed the flow of social contributions into the relevant scheme. The 
frantic search for fiscal savings has not spared social services, some of which 
(e.g. the successful Home Help programme) suffered significantly. On the whole, 
the supply of social benefits seems to have been reduced rather than increased. 
And yet, to prevent the economic crisis from turning into a social catastrophe, a 
concerted effort is needed to tighten the social safety net and to compensate the 
weakest groups from its adverse effects. 
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Appendix  
  
TABLE 1 - Inequality indices 
 2009 2010 difference (%) 
Gini coefficient 0.349 0.350 +0.05 
coefficient of variation 0.800 0.786 -1.68 
S80/S20 income share ratio 6.109 6.193 +1.39 
 
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0. 
 
TABLE 2 - Poverty rates: poverty line at 60% of median incomes 
 2009 2010 difference (p.p.) 
all 20.06 20.88 +0.82 
gender    
men 19.04 20.01 +0.97 
women 21.02 21.70 +0.68 
age    
0-15 21.41 22.31 +0.90 
16-29 19.02 20.12 +1.10 
30-44 16.44 17.93 +1.49 
45-64 19.02 19.81 +0.79 
65+ 24.61 24.53 -0.08 
household head is:    
unemployed 51.09 60.14 +9.05 
employee (public sector or banking) 0.31 0.42 +0.11 
employee (private sector excl. banking) 12.69 12.31 -0.38 
liberal profession 3.79 3.72 -0.07 
own account worker 16.63 17.39 +0.76 
farmer 46.88 45.56 -1.32 
pensioner 24.74 24.72 -0.02 
other 20.65 20.56 -0.09 
 
Note:  The poverty threshold for a person living alone was €570 per month in 2009 vs. €543 per month in 
2010. In the case of a family of four (couple with two children) the poverty threshold was €1198 per 
month in 2009 vs. €1140 per month in 2010. Individuals are ranked according to their household 
disposable income, equivalised by the “modified OECD” equivalence scale. Household disposable 
income is defined as total income, from all sources, of all household members, net of taxes and social 
insurance contributions.  
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0. 
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TABLE 3 - Poverty rates: poverty line at 40% of median incomes 
 2009 2010 difference (p.p.) 
all 7.28 7.95 +0.67 
gender    
men 7.04 7.54 +0.50 
women 7.50 8.33 +0.83 
age    
0-15 8.51 9.74 +1.23 
16-29 8.30 8.90 +0.60 
30-44 6.35 7.55 +1.20 
45-64 8.27 8.74 +0.47 
65+ 5.29 5.30 +0.01 
household head is:    
unemployed 34.77 38.53 +3.76 
employee (public sector or banking) 0.00 0.00 +0.00 
employee (private sector excl. banking) 3.32 2.87 -0.45 
liberal profession 0.99 0.97 -0.02 
own account worker 5.78 6.69 +0.91 
farmer 24.26 22.70 -1.56 
pensioner 5.56 5.46 -0.10 
other 9.74 9.59 -0.15 
 
Note: The poverty threshold for a person living alone was €380 per month in 2009 vs. €362 per month in 
2010. In the case of a family of four (couple with two children) the poverty threshold was €799 per month 
in 2009 vs. €760 per month in 2010. Individuals are ranked according to their household disposable 
income, equivalised by the “modified OECD” equivalence scale. Household disposable income is defined 
as total income, from all sources, of all household members, net of taxes and social insurance 
contributions. 
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0. 
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TABLE 4 - Poverty rates: poverty line at 60%  
of 2009 median incomes adjusted for inflation 
 
 2009 2010 difference (p.p.) 
all 20.06 25.45 +5.39 
gender    
men 19.04 24.52 +5.48 
women 21.02 26.34 +5.32 
age    
0-15 21.41 27.87 +6.46 
16-29 19.02 25.27 +6.25 
30-44 16.44 22.04 +5.60 
45-64 19.02 23.53 +4.51 
65+ 24.61 29.39 +4.78 
household head is:    
unemployed 51.09 63.71 +12.62 
employee (public sector or banking) 0.31 1.40 +1.09 
employee (private sector excl. banking) 12.69 16.36 +3.67 
liberal profession 3.79 3.72 -0.07 
own account worker 16.63 21.32 +4.69 
farmer 46.88 50.87 +3.99 
pensioner 24.74 29.06 +4.32 
other 20.65 28.57 +7.92 
 
Note: The poverty threshold for a person living alone was €570 per month in 2009 vs. €597 per month in 
2010. In the case of a family of four (couple with two children) the poverty threshold was €1198 per 
month in 2009 vs. €1254 per month in 2010. Individuals are ranked according to their household 
disposable income, equivalised by the “modified OECD” equivalence scale. Household disposable 
income is defined as total income, from all sources, of all household members, net of taxes and social 
insurance contributions.  
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0. 
 
TABLE 5 - Redistributive effect of austerity measures 
 
values of Gini coefficient Reynolds-
Smolensky 
index actual counterfactual 
income tax 0.34962 0.35007  +0.00045 
pension benefits 0.34962 0.34959 -0.00003 
public sector pay 0.34962  0.35250  +0.00288 
pensioners’ solidarity contribution 0.34962 0.35021  +0.00059 
 
Note: The Reynolds-Smolensky index shows the difference between the actual value of the Gini 
coefficient in 2010 and its counterfactual value in the absence of the policy changes being assessed, 
keeping all other effects constant. 
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0. 
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FIGURE 1 - Changes in relative income share by decile 
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Note: Income deciles were constructed according to the “modified OECD” equivalence scale, based on equivalised disposable income in the counterfactual scenario. 
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0. 
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FIGURE 2 - Absolute and relative income loss by decile 
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Note: Income loss is measured in real terms (i.e. adjusted for inflation), averaged for each decile. Income deciles were constructed according to the “modified OECD” 
equivalence scale, based on equivalised disposable income in the counterfactual scenario. 
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0. 
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FIGURE 3 - Distribution of fiscal savings by income decile 
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Note: Income deciles were constructed according to the “modified OECD” equivalence scale, based on equivalised disposable income in the counterfactual scenario. 
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0. 
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TABLE A.1 - EUROMOD uprating factors 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Income from dependent employment 
civil service 1.000 1.038 1.112 1.170 1.058 
public utilities 1.000 1.071 1.159 1.248 1.179 
banking 1.000 1.089 1.089 1.129 1.109 
non-banking private firms 1.000 1.061 1.130 1.162 1.128 
Income from self employment 
farming 1.000 1.008 0.946 0.920 0.899 
own account workers 1.000 1.052 1.117 1.169 1.110 
liberal professions 1.000 1.052 1.117 1.169 1.110 
Investment / property income 
Investment 1.000 1.031 1.119 1.089 1.164 
property and rents 1.000 1.045 1.086 1.125 1.152 
Other income 
private transfers 1.000 1.052 1.117 1.169 1.110 
non-cash income 1.000 1.052 1.117 1.169 1.110 
income received by people aged under 16 1.000 1.052 1.117 1.169 1.110 
Retirement pensions / benefits 
main old age pension 1.000 1.040 1.071 1.071 1.071 
supplementary old age pension 1.000 1.040 1.071 1.071 1.071 
other minor pensions 1.000 1.040 1.071 1.071 1.071 
survivors pension 1.000 1.040 1.071 1.071 1.071 
orphans pension 1.000 1.040 1.071 1.071 1.071 
pensioners’ social solidarity benefit 1.000 1.218 1.436 1.436 1.436 
social pension 1.000 1.220 1.449 1.449 1.487 
private pension 1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.139 
Unemployment benefits  
unemployment insurance  1.000 1.181 1.299 1.459 1.459 
unemployment assistance 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
minor unemployment benefits 1.000 1.181 1.299 1.459 1.459 
Family benefits 
3rd child benefit  1.000 1.029 1.069 1.091 1.119 
large family benefit 1.000 1.029 1.069 1.091 1.119 
lifetime pension to many-children mothers 1.000 1.029 1.069 1.091 1.119 
civil servants’ family benefit 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
support to families of children at school 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
minor family benefits 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Sickness / maternity benefits 
contributory maternity benefits  1.000 1.052 1.117 1.169 1.110 
health benefits  1.000 1.052 1.117 1.169 1.110 
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TABLE A.1 (cont’d) - EUROMOD uprating factors 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Disability benefits 
invalidity pensions  1.000 1.040 1.071 1.071 1.071 
disability benefits 1.000 1.045 1.127 1.218 1.318 
Other benefits 
housing benefits  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
scholarships and grants  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
minor social assistance benefits  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
large property tax 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
Tax relief 
loan value 1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.139 
financial capital 1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.139 
rent paid 1.000 1.045 1.086 1.125 1.152 
education expenses 1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.140 
housing cost 1.000 1.031 1.119 1.089 1.164 
interest on mortgage payment  1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.139 
other housing costs 1.000 1.031 1.119 1.089 1.164 
medical expenses 1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.139 
expenses for new heating systems 1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.139 
alimony expenditure 1.000 1.029 1.066 1.080 1.093 
other maintenance payments 1.000 1.029 1.066 1.080 1.093 
expenditure on private pensions  1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.139 
nominal GDP deflator 1.000 1.029 1.066 1.080 1.093 
harmonised consumer price index 1.000 1.030 1.074 1.088 1.139 
 
Source: El.Stat., Bank of Greece and various benefit-providing agencies. 
 42 
 
 
 
TABLE A.2 - Unemployment rates: by age, gender  
and education attainment (%) 
 
 
original 
database LFS 2010 
adjusted 
database 
men all (aged 20-64) 6.3 9.9 10.0 
20-24 20.2 25.4 26.1 
25-29 12.0 16.4 15.3 
30-44 3.7 8.7 8.4 
45-64 4.9 6.8 7.1 
PhD or Master’s 4.2 6.7 7.1 
university 4.7 6.1 6.1 
technical and post secondary 8.0 10.3 10.3 
upper secondary 6.7 10.2 10.2 
lower secondary 6.4 12.2 12.2 
primary (completed) 6.1 10.0 10.0 
incomplete primary / no schooling 8.3 19.0 18.7 
women all (aged 20-64) 13.0 15.6 15.7 
20-24 38.1 39.7 40.6 
25-29 18.6 23.0 24.3 
30-44 11.7 15.0 13.8 
45-64 6.0 9.1 8.3 
PhD or Master’s 22.5 9.4 22.5 
university 7.6 10.5 10.5 
technical and post secondary 13.3 19.2 19.2 
upper secondary 15.5 17.7 17.7 
lower secondary 16.7 17.7 17.7 
primary (completed) 11.4 13.4 13.4 
incomplete primary / no schooling 6.4 18.3 14.2 
 
Note: EUROMOD originally relied on data from EU-SILC 2007. To account for the rise in 
unemployment, the underlying database was adjusted using data from LFS 2010. 
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0. 
 
 
 
 
 43 
 
TABLE A.3 - Correction for tax evasion 
income source assumed rate of under-reporting (%) 
salaries and wages 1 
pension benefits 0 
self-employment earnings 25 
farming incomes 55 
 
Note: Stylised rates on the basis of the findings of Matsaganis & Flevotomou (2010). 
 
 
TABLE A.4 - Correction for non-take up 
 
number of recipients 
full take up admin data correction 
social pension  102,842 63,806 71,694 
unemployment assistance for older workers  33,523 1,089 784 
 
Source: Various benefit-providing agencies; EUROMOD version F4.0. 
 
 
TABLE A.5 - Income position of earners by occupational group (2009) 
 
Position in the distribution 
low income middle income high income 
farmers 50 38 12 
own account workers 20 37 43 
private sector excl. banking 18 45 37 
liberal professions 4 11 85 
civil servants 2 24 74 
public enterprises 1 34 65 
banking employees 0 25 75 
unemployed  47 40 13 
pensioners 31 48 21 
 
Note: “Low income” refers to the bottom 30% of the distribution (i.e. covers deciles 1-3). “High 
income” refers to the top 30% of the distribution (i.e. covers deciles 8-10). “Middle income” covers 
deciles 4-7 (inclusive). 
Source: EUROMOD version F4.0. 
  
 
 
  45
The geographical dimension of austerity 
Vassilis Monastiriotis# 
 
Abstract 
The paper examines the geographical impact of the Greek austerity measures, 
focusing on two types of effects: those that are essentially compositional and 
those that concern longer-run processes of cross-regional adjustment. It finds a 
potentially large and spatially uneven impact, which can enhance existing 
disparities in the country. Owing to deep-rooted spatial imbalances, under 
certain conditions this can trigger a cumulative divergence process that may be 
hard to address in the future. To correct for this spatial asymmetry policy 
efforts should concentrate on raising revenues from a more progressive income 
tax system and relaxing the conditions for the absorption of EU funds to 
facilitate a badly-needed fiscal stimulus. 
 
Keywords: Austerity measures; Greece; Regional imbalances; Composition 
effects; Cumulative causation 
JEL Codes: R11, R12, R38, O18 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Although in the initial stages of the global financial crisis Greece did not seem 
to be particularly affected –and, indeed, it was considered to be rather 
insulated, due to its low openness and Eurozone membership– by the end of 
2009 Greece entered an unprecedented fiscal and sovereign debt crisis, which 
is still threatening the stability of the country and of the EMU at large. In 
response to these developments, and pushed by its European partners and – 
since May 2010 – lenders of last resort, the Greek government set out to 
                                                 
#
 I am indebted to Panos Tsakloglou, Manos Matsaganis, George Petrakos, Christos Koutsambelas and 
Maria Tsiapa for their valuable help with data collection. Earlier versions of the paper have been 
presented at the Yale University Hellenic Studies Programme seminar series, the 2011 Conference of 
the Greek Regional Science Association, and the 2011 Meeting of the Urban and Regional Economics 
Study Group (UK). A revised version is forthcoming in a special issue of the Cambridge Journal of 
Regions, Economy and Society on the topic of “Geographies of Austerity”. I am grateful to the journal 
referees and editors, as well as to conference participants, for their useful comments and suggestions on 
previous drafts of the paper. Full responsibility for opinions expressed and any errors of interpretation 
remain of course with the author. 
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implement an extensive package of austerity measures. As with elsewhere in 
Europe, the austerity measures undertaken by the Greek government are 
geographically horizontal, lacking an explicit spatial dimension. This does not 
mean however that the measures are spatially neutral. Due to regional 
differences in specialisations, incomes, and economic capacities, 
geographically horizontal measures can have significant spatial effects, 
affecting different regions disproportionately.  
This composition issue is of course not unique to Greece28 – but it is 
particularly important there, due to the country’s acute and multi-faceted 
inequalities and weak cross-regional equilibration mechanisms (Petrakos and 
Saratsis, 2000; Christopoulos and Tsionas, 2004; Monastiriotis, 2009). In 
Greece, more than elsewhere in Europe, economic activity is highly 
concentrated in a few regions, with Attica, the broader region of the capital city 
of Athens, accounting for some 40% of population and just short of 50% of 
national GDP. Industrial activity is also largely concentrated there, as is the 
incidence of foreign-owned and export-oriented manufacturing (Petrakos and 
Psycharis, 2004; Fotopoulos et al, 2010; Monastiriotis and Jordaan, 2010). The 
remaining regions have very low specialisations, mainly in tourism (island 
regions, especially the South Aegean and Crete), agriculture (accounting for 
over 30% of employment in Thessaly, Peloponnese, Eastern Macedonia and 
Thrace, Western Greece and parts of Central Greece and Central Macedonia), 
and light manufacturing (Central Greece and Central Macedonia), with 
financial and other business services accounting for less than 5% everywhere in 
the country outside the main urban regions of Athens and Thessaloniki.  
Such structural imbalances across the Greek regions, and the developmental 
weaknesses that they manifest, can raise concerns that the austerity measures 
may have significantly differentiated implications across space – not only in 
                                                 
28
 For example, Rowthorn (2010) has recently argued that the public-sector cuts announced by the 
coalition government in Britain in 2010 will affect disproportionately the north of the country, for 
which public sector employment represents a higher proportion of total employment and employment 
growth. Inversely, deficit reduction measures focusing on the revenue side (tax rises) will hurt 
disproportionately the higher-income regions of the south. 
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relation to compositional income effects but also with regard to more structural 
and more permanent effects to the real economy. In countries with strong cross-
regional equilibrating mechanisms (migration, capital mobility, price 
adjustments) and a history of effective policy interventions to address regional 
or other imbalances, such a differentiation may not matter in the long run – 
especially if the demand shock induced by the austerity measures is considered 
to be transitory, with measures applied only for a short period of time. But in a 
country like Greece, and in the context of a prolonged fiscal consolidation 
programme which is already expected to last at least until 2015 if not well 
beyond (Monokroussos, 2011), this differentiation may lead to more permanent 
divisions across space – perhaps in a cumulative fashion.  
Of course, as the implementation of these measures is still unfolding, it is not 
possible to provide here an accurate measurement of the spatial consequences 
of these measures and of their long-run implications. Given however the lack of 
attention from the side of policy to the spatial dimension of these issues, a 
preliminary examination of the geographical effects of the austerity measures is 
particularly important. This is not only in order to provide an early warning to 
regional policy, about the future challenges that it may face, but also for 
evaluating the suitability and effectiveness of the measures at the national level. 
Although fiscal consolidation is an unquestionable priority in the face of a 
national default and a possible exit from the Eurozone, it is important that the 
means for achieving this do not compromise the future economic cohesion of 
the country by intensifying already pronounced regional imbalances.  
With this in mind, in this paper we pursue two complimentary pieces of 
analysis. First, we undertake an ex-ante accounting evaluation of the 
geographic composition of the income effects of the austerity measures 
announced and implemented in Greece since March 2010.29 We rely on 
information from a variety of sources about the distribution of public sector 
                                                 
29
 Consistent with its tradition of ad hoc policy design (Monastiriotis and Antoniades, 2011), Greece 
has not made so far any efforts to undertake an ex-ante impact analysis of the austerity measures that it 
implements.  
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employment, the incidence of low- and high-pay and of tax evasion, and the 
relative importance for each region of funds distributed through public 
investment and public transfers. Second, we offer an exploratory discussion 
about how the asymmetric income effects may be translated into longer-run 
structural imbalances across the Greek regions, by elaborating on the relevance 
and mechanics of a cumulative causation process that can be triggered by these 
asymmetries. As mentioned already, the purpose here is not to predict with any 
claimed accuracy the regional evolutions of the future, but to identify the 
possible threats to regional and economic cohesion that the horizontal 
implementation of the austerity measures may entail. Although this discussion 
is by its nature specific to the Greek context, some of the issues raised are 
expected to be of wider relevance to Europe, as the wave of fiscal consolidation 
measures extends to other countries in the European south and beyond.  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 examines briefly 
how the economic crisis spread to Greece and reviews the austerity measures 
implemented. Section 3 examines the direct spatial impact of the austerity 
measures (compositional effects). Section 4 explores the longer-run 
implications of these measures while the last section concludes with some 
implications for policy. 
 
2. The Greek crisis and the austerity programme 
As has been discussed extensively in the popular literature, what started in 
2007 as a mortgage crisis in the USA soon extended to most of the rest of the 
developed world in the form of a financial crisis, as uncertainty about who 
holds ‘toxic assets’ and ‘bad debt’ spread. The liquidity crisis that this 
translated to led to an all-out economic crisis, with firms in the real part of the 
economy facing increasing difficulties in financing their everyday activities and 
wider investment plans. In this global context, Greece appeared initially to be 
well protected from the economic fallout. The country had very low exposure 
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to international trade (with goods exports representing a mere 8% of national 
GDP), a rather vibrant banking system with low exposure to toxic assets, and a 
history of strong growth for over a decade. Participation in EMU seemed at 
first a blessing, as currency pressures hit mainly countries at the vicinity of the 
eurozone, while the common currency appeared until the second half of 2009 to 
provide a safe haven for countries with traditionally weak currencies and 
fundamentals.  
Underneath this, however, there were two important structural constraints that 
were soon to expose Greece to an unprecedented fiscal crisis. First, Greece’s 
chronic inability to control its public expenditures and generate sufficient 
revenues in line with countries elsewhere in Europe. Especially on the revenue 
side, Greece significantly underperformed relative to the European average, 
with tax revenues as a share of GDP being about 7 percentage points lower 
(around 32%) and declining since the early 2000s (Servera and Moschovis, 
2008). Weak tax collection mechanisms and pervasive corruption and tax 
evasion are deep-rooted problems that have systematically contributed to this 
(Featherstone, 2003; Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 2010; Skouras and 
Christodoulakis, 2011; Kalyvas et al, 2011). Second, systemic problems in the 
EMU design which created a structural asymmetry within the Eurozone, 
resulting in real currency appreciation and continuous loss of competitiveness 
in the European south.30 Low interest rates, partly due to suppressed wage 
growth in Germany, led to fast consumption expansion in less competitive 
countries such as Greece and to asset-price inflation (including a housing 
bubble). Owing to Greece’s weak industrial base and high product market 
rigidities, these developments led in turn to accelerating inflation, rather than 
accelerating productivity growth (Mitsopoulos and Pelagidis, 2011). As EMU 
does not allow for national currency devaluation, this in turn pushed unit labour 
                                                 
30
 In the first eight years since the introduction of the euro Greece is estimated to have experienced a 
real currency appreciation of over 20% (Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2011). To some extent, the design 
of the EMU architecture also allowed for an imperfect monitoring and enforcement of EU rules, which 
made early action to correct emerging imbalances less likely, thus also contributing to the subsequent 
crisis. 
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costs upwards, contributing to a continuously deteriorating current account 
deficit (which, at 14% of GDP in 2008, had surpassed that experienced by 
Argentina before its default in 2001) and putting further pressures on the 
country’s public finances.  
Irrespective, however, of these structural imbalances, the crisis was triggered 
by a more subtle event that had to do with another Greek particularity, that of 
weak monitoring and apparent mis-reporting of its fiscal data. Starting from a 
forecasted budget deficit of 3.7% of GDP (as reported in the 2009 Convergence 
Programme in December 2008), successive revisions of the deficit forecasts 
around the period of the October 2009 elections brought the deficit to 5.4% 
(October), 10.6% (November) and later 12.7% of GDP (December 2009). The 
official figure was finally confirmed by Eurostat in November 2010 to run at 
the spectacular rate of 15.4% of GDP. In a climate of international financial 
instability, and at least partly owing to the lack of a robust response by the EU 
institutions and member states to the unfolding crisis, this turmoil created first a 
credibility crisis that pushed Greek government bond spreads to unattainable 
levels (over 1,000 basis points in March 2010). Naturally this destabilised 
further the Greek economy, as economic confidence collapsed and fears of a 
deep recession materialised, putting additional pressures on the government 
debt and the budget deficit. The situation got out of control by spring 2010 
leading to an acute fiscal (sovereign debt) crisis, with a possible default 
becoming seemingly inevitable.  
Under the fear of the implications that a Greek default, inside the Eurozone, 
would have politically for the EMU project and economically for the other 
member states, the European Union agreed, together with the IMF and the ECB 
(the so-called, troika), literally on the 11th hour31, an emergency rescue package 
in the form of a €110bn loan to the Greek government (paid in instalments over 
a two-year period). The rescue package entailed a set of provisions for the 
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 The rescue package was officially announced on Sunday 8 May, a few hours before the markets 
opening and the Greek debt becoming non-serviced, thus leading to a de facto default.  
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implementation of a range of austerity measures and accompanying structural 
reforms aiming at recovering public finances and helping the economy regain 
some of its lost competitiveness. As the public-financial situation worsened and 
the economy kept sliding into an ever-deepening recession, the austerity 
measures became gradually more severe and more encompassing, raising 
significant public discontent but also weakening further domestic demand and 
investor confidence. Indeed, rumours about a Greek default continue today, 
even after an agreement in the March 2011 European Council to extend the 
repayment period of the Greek loan and to reduce the interest rate charged, and 
the intensifying efforts since late June 2011 to achieve a roll-over of the Greek 
debt with voluntary participation from the private sector. If anything, this 
partial debt restructuring has so far been taken by the markets as a signal of 
increased default risk leading to a further downgrading of Greece by the 
international credit rating institutions.  
It is in this context that the Greek government announced, first in March 2010 
and at various stages subsequently, a series of austerity measures aiming at 
reducing its excessive budget deficit to below the 3% threshold by 2015. The 
original fiscal consolidation measures of 2010, which aimed at creating savings 
to the value of 7.4% of GDP, were gradually amended with measures 
representing a fiscal adjustment equal to €14.4bn (6.3% of GDP) in 2011 and 
an additional €23bn for the period 2012-2015.32 A failure to fully meet the 
2010 deficit targets, as GDP declined faster than initially hoped and 
government revenues continued to grow anaemically, combined with 
increasing pressures from the ‘troika’ for tough adherence to fiscal 
consolidation to fend-off market speculation against the other ailing Eurozone 
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 As announced in the Greek Medium-Term Fiscal Adjustment Programme (MFAP) on 15 April 2011. 
Subsequent revisions in May and June 2011 brought this figure to above €28bn. The revised MFAP 
was finally approved by parliament (with a marginal majority) on 29 June 2011. The plan introduces a 
large number of additional measures, most notably the reduction of the non-taxable income threshold 
from €12,000 to €8,000 and the launching of an extensive privatisation programme. The paper does not 
take into account these additional measures, but focuses largely on measures introduced in 2010 and 
until the spring of 2011. It should be noted that the new measures under the MFAP remain spatially-
horizontal and largely tax-based and in this sense they continue to be in the direction of the measures 
discussed and analysed here.   
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economies, are responsible for this. On the revenue side, the main measures 
include a rise in VAT (from 19 to 23% for the standard and from 9 to 11% for 
the basic rate and an expansion to product categories not previously taxed) and 
in taxes on fuel, tobacco and alcohol, an one-off tax levy of 1% on very 
profitable firms and high-income households (complemented, more recently, 
with additional tax levies to households most, but all, of which have some 
degree of progressivity) and the introduction of a new income tax scale – which 
however has minimal budget effects. More important are the measures on the 
expenditure side, which included initially a 7% reduction in the budget of the 
public investment programme (and further reductions in an ad hoc fashion 
more recently), various cuts in social transfers and benefits, perhaps to a value 
of well-above 5%, and more significant cuts in pensions and the public sector. 
The latter include: a nominal freeze in pensions and public sector wages until 
2012; abolishing across the public sector the so-called 13th (and 14th) salary and 
replacing it with two flat payments of €500 (€400 for pensions); a variable 
reduction in benefits in the so-called ‘narrow public sector’ (mainly, civil 
servants), ranging from 8% for earnings below €14,000 pa to 13% for earnings 
over €27,000 pa, representing on average a 10% reduction in nominal take-
home pay; a horizontal 10% salary cut for employees in the so-called ‘wider 
public sector’ (utilities and other state owned enterprises and public bodies) 
which was later extended and made more progressive; a “five out – one in” rule 
for hiring in the public sector and abolition of fixed-term contracts; and, 
prospectively, compulsory dismissals in parts of the ‘wider public sector’ and 
in local government. Savings from the rationalisation of expenditures are also 
envisaged (by improving public management, rationalising health expenditure, 
the consolidation of local authority budgets and reduced military 
procurements), as are increased revenues from tackling tax evasion (although 
the latter was removed from the MFAP, as the ineffectiveness of the Greek 
government in this front made budgeting for savings from tackling tax evasion 
elusive).  
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Crucially, with this policy approach, the strategy for stimulating growth as an 
exit-route out of the crisis has been left to reforms aiming at market 
liberalisation and to wage-depression aiming at restoring international 
competitiveness – while public consumption and investment are being 
significantly retrenched. This needed not be the only policy option – but, at 
least until very recently, it very much appeared to be so given two very real 
constraints. On the one hand, the evident inability of the Greek government to 
mobilise resources either internally (due to the recessionary impacts of 
taxation) or from abroad.33 On the other, the unwillingness of the EU to address 
the Greek (and Eurozone) crisis in a more holistic and systemic way (e.g., by 
devising a mechanism for debt restructuring within the Eurozone and for 
stimulating growth in the European periphery). Moreover, as the possibility of 
an EU-induced fiscal stimulus is effectively ruled out, some less drastic policy 
instruments that could help with stimulating internal demand were also 
discarded, at least until the end of June 2011. First, a front-loaded absorption of 
Cohesion Funds with a temporary waiver on the requirement for national co-
financing. Such an option was considered by the European Commission in the 
early stages of the crisis but, largely due to fears of compromising the 
credibility of Greece and of EMU towards the markets, has been subsequently 
abandoned (Brunsden, 2009). It was only on 23 June 2011 that the European 
Commission brought this issue back on the table – and, as it seems, a partial 
release of such funds, with a reduced Greek participation to co-financing, will 
now take place in the second half of 2011.34 Second, the provision by the 
European Investment Bank of specially designated loans to ‘pre-finance’ the 
national contribution to funds absorbed under the Cohesion Funds – a vehicle 
which allows to maintain performance incentives while removing the acute 
                                                 
33
 As mentioned previously, spreads for Greek bonds are prohibitive; the efforts of the Greek 
government to generate revenues from donations by the Greek Diaspora have also not proven 
particularly fruitful. An extensive privatisation programme to the value of €50bn, agreed with the 
‘troika’ in March 2011, is also not directed towards stimulating internal demand, as the prospective 
revenues are already earmarked for the reduction of the country’s external debt (Monastiriotis, 2011).  
34
 Source: http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110623/ap_on_bi_ge/eu_europe_financial_crisis_57. 
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budgeting constraints. Greece already received – but not used35 – a €2bn loan 
under this scheme in 2010. Owing to its poor absorptive capacity but also being 
cautious about signalling a lack of commitment to structural reforms and fiscal 
consolidation, both the ‘troika’ and the Greek government had until June 2011 
opted to abandon this route to dealing with the crisis – thus entering into what 
is apparently a negative spiral of depressed growth and ever more pervasive 
austerity measures. It remains to be seen how and by how much this will be 
rectified in the future.  
 
3. The geographical dimension of the austerity measures 
It is clear that the measures included in the Greek austerity programme will 
have variable effects on the Greek regions as long as the latter have different 
compositions of public sector employment and different income distributions. 
To examine these differences we focus on three broad categories of measures, 
namely: changes in public expenditures (income transfers and public 
investment), changes in public sector employment and pay, and changes in 
direct and indirect taxation (including measures aiming at tackling tax evasion).  
As mentioned already, in 2010-11 public investments are being reduced 
officially by 7% but in reality (accounting for absorption rates) by multiples of 
this.36 Moreover, as the ‘troika’ pressures Greece to accelerate its public 
investment programme in order to make use of EU funds, public investment is 
shifted towards ‘soft’ interventions (e.g., on entrepreneurship than on 
infrastructure) and becomes more concentrated.37 Both developments suggest a 
greater concentration of resources to the main urban areas and in particular 
                                                 
35
 See http://www.eib.org/about/press/2010/2010-114-eib-bolsters-key-investments-in-greece-with-eur-
2-billion-loan.htm?lang=-en. Curiously, by June 2011 Greece had only advanced 25% of this money.  
36
 According to newspaper reports, in the first quarter of 2011 Greece had released only 8% of the 
€8.5bn earmarked for public investments in its annual budget. (Source: 
http://www.skai.gr/news/finance/article/167754/pagosan-oi-dimosies-ependuseis/)  
37
 According to latest reports in the press ten large infrastructure investments to the value of €4.65bn 
are planned for the next period, five of which concentrate in the metropolitan regions of Athens and 
Thessaloniki (Eleftherotypia, 21/12/2010 – http://www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=234965).  
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around Athens and Thessaloniki at the expense of allocations to the north and 
west of the country. As ‘soft’ interventions tend to be allocated in a less 
redistributive fashion (following more the distribution of population than the 
inverse of regional incomes), it appears that more peripheral areas that have 
traditionally relied more on ‘hard’ public investments may lose out dearly. On 
the basis of past allocations (for the period 2005-08 – see Figure 1), the worst 
affected regions seem to be those of Western Macedonia (which, with public 
investment representing 5% of local GDP, may lose up to 0.5% of its GDP in 
foregone public investment), Ipeiros, and the North Aegean. In contrast, in 
regions such as Attica, Athens, Crete and Thessaloniki the impact will be 
minimal (less than 0.05% of local GDP).  
FIGURE 1 - Public investment and income transfers by region 
 
Public investment    Income transfers 
Note: The maps categorise regions along four quartiles, with darker shades representing higher values. 
Public investment data (as a share of regional GDP) refer to average 2005-08 values and are derived 
from Monastiriotis and Psycharis (2011). Income transfers (state benefits as a share of average 
household incomes) are derived from the 2004-05 Greek Household Budget Survey (ELSTAT). 
Similarly, on the basis of the most recently available household income data 
(right panel of Figure 1), the effects of the cuts in benefits and other income 
transfers to households, which are in the area upwards of 5%, seem also to 
affect more strongly regions in the northern and north-western periphery (as 
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well as, in this case, Crete and Thessaly). Attica, Athens and the South Aegean 
remain the least affected regions. Again, the effect is projected to be a 
disproportionate decline in incomes in the periphery, with East Macedonia and 
Thrace being by far the most affected region (experiencing a projected decline 
by over 0.5% of household incomes).  
Despite their notable spatial variation, however, these effects are not 
particularly sizeable, relatively speaking. Indeed, the main effects on private 
consumption and household incomes are anticipated to come from the 
significant reductions in public sector pay and in pensions. Using salaried 
income data from the Greek Labour Force Survey and data on salaried and total 
household income from the Greek Household Budget Survey (HBS) we 
calculate that before the crisis the public sector accounted for close to 20% of 
total disposable household incomes in the country, while another 20% was 
accounted for by pensions.38 On the basis of this, the implemented cuts in 
public sector pay and in pensions, and the additional prospective cuts for high-
earners in the public sector, amount to an income reduction of over 4% 
nationally. Adding to this the impact of the public sector employment cuts 
(almost universal abolition of fixed-term contracts, ‘5 out – 1 in’ rule, and 
further downsizing of employment in public utilities), suggests a much more 
significant effect than that of the cuts in pubic expenditures (in static terms – 
not accounting for possible multiplier effects). As is shown however in Table 1, 
this effect can be particularly uneven across space. Combined, public sector 
pay and pensions constitute close to or over 50% of household incomes in the 
north and north-west of the country (Ipeiros, Western Macedonia and North 
Aegean), while they are less than 35% in South Aegean and Crete (close to 
40% in Athens and Central Greece). Assuming a similar geographical 
allocation of cuts, this implies a reduction in household incomes by some 40% 
more in the northern periphery than in the south.  
                                                 
38
 Full calculations can be made available upon request.  
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The effects however can be even more pronounced owing to the composition of 
public sector employment in each region. The three most affected regions in the 
north and west of the country also possess by far the highest shares of incomes 
generated by fixed-term contracts in the public sector – where the cuts are even 
more drastic as such jobs are simply being lost. Together with the regions of 
Thessaloniki and Western Greece (again in the north and west of the country), 
these three regions also possess the highest shares of incomes accounted for by 
high-salary earners in the public sector (e.g., 2.2% in Ipeiros versus 1.3% in the 
Peloponnese), who also experience the most severe cuts.39 Of them, the North 
Aegean and especially Western Macedonia also have unusually high shares of 
incomes generated in public utilities, which are also disproportionately 
affected. All in all, the three regions that stand out to be more severely affected 
by the austerity measures in the public sector are those of Western Macedonia 
the North Aegean and Ipeiros – which incidentally have the lowest shares of 
employment in the private sector (including self-employment) and the weakest 
industrial bases. According to the figures presented in Table 1, the measures 
taken in the public sector can induce a negative income effect of between 6.5-
8.0% in these regions, which contrasts vividly with the estimated effect in the 
southern and metropolitan parts of the country, which is projected to be closer 
to 4.5%.  
                                                 
39
 According to current plans, by up to 25% in 2012 (see www.enet.gr/?i=news.el.article&id=264850). 
Despite the high shares of high-salary public sector employees observed there, these regions also 
possess the highest shares of low-paid employment, as discussed later.  
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TABLE 1 - Selected components of household income by region 
Region 
A
ll 
pu
bl
ic
 
se
ct
o
r 
Pe
n
sio
n
er
s 
A
ll 
a
ffe
ct
ed
 
in
co
m
es
 
Pu
bl
ic
 
se
ct
o
r 
te
m
ps
 
C
en
tr
a
l g
o
v
t 
hi
gh
-
w
a
ge
s 
Pu
bl
ic
 
u
til
iti
es
 
Pr
o
jec
tio
n
 
o
f 
to
ta
l e
ffe
ct
 
North-west 
West Macedonia 28.40% 20.30% 48.70% 2.70% 1.90% 9.20% 7.97% 
Ipeiros 23.80% 29.70% 53.50% 1.60% 2.20% 1.00% 6.90% 
North and north-east 
East Mac. & 
Thrace 15.10% 20.20% 35.30% 0.70% 1.30% 0.30% 4.25% 
Central 
Macedonia 16.30% 22.70% 39.00% 1.10% 1.20% 1.10% 4.96% 
North Aegean 22.80% 27.10% 49.90% 1.50% 2.40% 2.10% 6.61% 
Western 
Ionian Islands 16.90% 27.00% 43.90% 1.00% 0.30% 0.80% 5.22% 
Western Greece 16.90% 27.10% 44.00% 0.90% 1.90% 0.80% 5.40% 
Central 
Thessaly 19.50% 22.10% 41.60% 1.20% 1.10% 0.90% 5.26% 
Central Greece 17.60% 22.40% 40.00% 1.10% 1.10% 1.70% 5.11% 
Attiki 18.80% 20.50% 39.30% 1.00% 1.30% 1.60% 4.99% 
South 
Peloponnese 16.00% 24.40% 40.40% 0.80% 1.30% 1.90% 4.99% 
South Aegean 16.30% 18.60% 34.90% 1.40% 0.00% 0.80% 4.55% 
Crete 12.80% 21.90% 34.70% 1.00% 1.40% 0.50% 4.43% 
Metropolitan 
Athens 18.80% 20.50% 39.30% 0.70% 1.80% 1.70% 4.86% 
Thessaloniki 16.30% 22.70% 39.00% 0.60% 2.50% 0.70% 4.77% 
Notes: Shares show income generated by the specific category as a proportion of total disposable 
household income. Data are derived from the 2004 and 2005 waves of the Greek Quarterly Labour 
Force Survey and the 2004/05 Household Budget Survey (ELSTAT), based on author’s calculations. 
The projection of the total effect (last column) is based on the following calculation: 20% cut in public 
utilities plus 80% cut in fixed-contract incomes plus 25% cut in high-wage incomes in central 
government plus 10% cut in pensions and in the remaining public sector.  
 
Turning to the examination of the impact of taxation, we start with the changes 
in indirect taxes. We rely on national-level estimates of the effects of these 
changes by income decile (from the micro-simulation study by Matsaganis and 
Leventi, 2011) and combine these with geographical information on the 
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distribution of household incomes from the HBS. Unsurprisingly, the incidence 
of low incomes, for which rises in indirect taxation (consumption levies and 
VAT) and the recently announced reduction in the non-taxable income 
threshold constitute a greater erosion of disposable incomes, is highest in the 
same regions previously projected to suffer most from the public sector cuts 
(see left panel of Figure 2). Nationally, without taking into account the 
additional measures included in the MFAP in June 2011, Matsaganis and 
Leventi (2011) predict a drop of purchasing power for the median household of 
about 4.5% (10% for incomes at the bottom decile and less than 3% for 
incomes at the top decile) – or about 3.8% of average household incomes. 
Simply projecting these estimates to the regional shares of incomes falling 
inside each decile of the national distribution of household incomes produces 
projections for the drop in purchasing power which range from 3.5% in Attica 
to 4.3% in Ipeiros and above 4% in North Aegean, Western Macedonia, East 
Macedonia & Thrace, Western Greece and the Peloponnese. The effect is again 
smallest in the metropolitan, central and southern regions. 
FIGURE 2 - Income shares to total regional household income 
  
Low-income share  Own-account high-income earners 
Note: The maps categorise regions along four quartiles, with darker shades representing higher values. 
All data are from the 2004-05 Greek Household Budget Survey (ELSTAT). 
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Given the geographical distribution of household incomes, a progressive 
income tax, in contrast to the effects of indirect taxation, would seem able to 
counterbalance some of the disproportionality of the effects observed 
previously. In their analysis of the redistributive effects of the new income tax 
scales, however, Matsaganis and Leventi (2011) find overall very minor effects 
and, in fact, even some small positive effects (reducing the tax burden) for 
households on higher incomes. As such households are disproportionately 
located in the metropolitan and southern regions, the effect of the new income 
tax appears also to lack spatially progressivity. As already mentioned, the 
recently announced income-tax measures are likely to have effects in the same 
direction, despite the fact that some of them (e.g., an income-based ‘solidarity 
contribution’ in the form of a progressive tax-levy) have indeed a progressive 
character.  
Among all the measures considered here, measuring the geographical impact of 
the attempts to tackle tax evasion is of course the most challenging. The only 
available estimates at the sub-national level in Greece come form another 
recent micro-simulation study (Matsaganis and Flevotomou, 2010), which 
found tax evasion to be highest in southern mainland Greece (at 16%) and 
lowest in the large metropolitan area of Athens (at 5.6%) – with northern 
mainland Greece and the island regions all ranging between 12-14%.40 On the 
face of this, assuming for illustration purposes a 50% success rate in taxing 
undeclared incomes41 at an effective tax rate of 35%, the government efforts 
will reduce disposable household incomes by between 1% (in Athens) and 
about 2.5% in the rest of the country (including the north-western periphery). 
If, however, as the government emphasises, efforts to curb tax evasion 
concentrate on particular occupational categories (private doctors, lawyers and 
other professionals) and especially on headline cases in the Greek capital, then 
the results may be drastically different. In the right panel of Figure 2 we depict 
                                                 
40
 The differences are mainly compositional, as income under-reporting was found to vary significantly 
with the type of activity (53% for farmers, 25% for the self-employed and 1% for salaried workers).  
41
 Despite reasonable scepticism about Greece’s ability to tackle this chronic problem, the government 
has taken already some notable headline actions targeting the so-called ‘large-scale tax evaders’. 
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the spatial distribution of the regional income shares generated by self-reported 
high-income own-account workers (from HBS microdata). As can be seen, 
such incomes are largely concentrated in central and southern Greece, 
including Athens. If the government was to concentrate its efforts to undeclared 
incomes from this group, then the spatial effects of these efforts would be most 
dissimilar to those of most of the measures examined above. As it turns out, 
however, the government’s efforts on this front seem to be subsiding, not 
intensifying, after the developments of June 2011. 
 
4. Does it matter? Exploring longer-run threats 
The finding that the austerity measures in Greece may have income effects that 
will differ systematically across regions is not particularly surprising.42 Poorer 
and more backward regions, which rely more on public sector employment and 
public transfers are bound to be more affected by these measures. This of 
course does not mean that policy measures should be taken to correct this 
asymmetry. If the Greek regions were sufficiently integrated and cross-regional 
equilibration mechanisms were operating efficiently, the effects of these 
measures, no matter how asymmetric, would eventually diffuse more or less 
evenly across space. Weakened demand in the ‘north’ would reduce product 
demand in the ‘south’, where much of industry and tradable services are 
located, thus also reducing incomes there. Reduced activity in the ‘north’ 
would be eased by out-migration to the ‘south’, pushing downwards wages 
there until equilibrium is achieved.  
It is however difficult to argue that such conditions exist in Greece. In the ten 
years before the crisis (1998-2007), unemployment rates in the high 
unemployment regions (northern and north-western Greece) averaged values 
3.5 higher than the regions located in the southern parts of the country. A rank 
                                                 
42
 It is however important given the lack of discussion in Greece about the spatial dimension of the 
austerity measures.   
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correlation of sub-regional unemployment rates between the start and end of 
this period returns a Spearman coefficient of 0.63, showing notable persistence 
in unemployment rankings across regions. And although unemployment 
disparities did indeed decline during the early phases of the crisis (with 
unemployment rising faster in the south, by over 60% between 2007-2010), 
more recently unemployment growth resumed faster in the north (rising 
between January 2010 and January 2011 by 130%, 77% and 40%, respectively, 
in the North Aegean, East Macedonia & Thrace, and Central Macedonia and by 
78% and 92%, respectively in Western Macedonia and Western Greece 
between March 2010 and March 2011) and disparities have been following 
again an upward trend returning to their pre-crisis level since January 2011.43  
This picture of regional unemployment performances reflects of course the 
weak cross-regional equilibrating capacity of the product and labour markets. 
Regional migration in the country is extremely low, estimated at 0.5% in 2007 
(for working age population – Monastiriotis and Pissarides, 2011). Self-
employment (mostly in family businesses and geographically-bound closed 
professions) represents almost 40% of total employment, while the share of 
dependent salaried employment outside the public sector is a dismal 30%. With 
manufacturing (including energy) representing a mere 12.5% of GVA 
nationally and only two regions having shares above 20% (Western Macedonia, 
where the main energy plants are located, which are publicly-owned, and 
Central Greece), the majority of goods and services consumed in Greece are 
either imported (goods) or locally produced (services).44 Under these 
circumstances, it seems unsurprising that regional equilibration remains limited 
– and the effects of any region-specific shocks are likely to be largely localised, 
with very limited spillovers to other regions.  
                                                 
43
 Calculations from ELSTAT data released 14 April 2011 (www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE 
/BUCKET /A0101/PressReleases/A0101_SJO02_DT_MM_01_2011_01_F_GR.pdf). The data for 
March 2011 show a continuation in the rise of regional disparities in unemployment rates, but this time 
with a substantial rise in unemployment in the South Aegean.  
44
 Quite tellingly, the value of imports of goods in 2007 was over double the gross value-added of 
domestically produced goods in agriculture, forestry, manufacturing and energy combined. (Source: 
ELSTAT, http://www.statistics.gr/portal/page/portal/ESYE/BUCKET/A0702/Other/A0702_SEL30_ 
TS_AN_00_2000 00_2010_01_P_BI_0.xls) 
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In these circumstances, it is possible that the austerity measures may produce 
important equilibrium changes in economic activity across the Greek regions, 
besides their static compositional effects. In the remainder of this section we 
trace this possibility, focusing on four processes that we consider to be of 
relevance in the Greek context: (a) the circular nature of declining demand; (b) 
the workings of economic behaviour under risk; (c) the importance of scale 
(agglomeration) for productivity and growth; and (d) the role of economic 
diversity and internationalisation as a buffer to asymmetric shocks. As noted in 
the introduction, the purpose is not to speculate on future economic 
developments in the country but to identify possible cumulative effects that 
may be triggered under the severity (section 2) and apparent asymmetry 
(section 3) of the negative demand shock induced by the fiscal crisis and the 
austerity measures.  
Our starting premise is that these measures do not only constitute a negative 
demand shock but, as they come to add to an existing recession, also create a 
demand deficiency – to which the Greek economy cannot respond not 
necessarily because it lacks flexibility but because it is resource/budget 
constrained. Given the relative closure of the regional economies in Greece, as 
discussed above, and the asymmetry of the austerity effects towards the most 
backward and resource-constrained regions in the country, this depressed 
demand nationally can possibly trigger a more permanent process of regional 
divergence, which may be difficult to break even when national economic 
performance recovers. We can think of the following mechanism. First, rising 
unemployment and lower incomes weaken disproportionately the consumption 
base of the most affected economies. In a recessionary environment this will 
lead to declining investment and job creation rates (even with unemployment 
raising technically the marginal product of labour). As capital becomes scarcer 
nationally (due to the substantial rise in borrowing costs), it is improbable that 
a sufficient amount of capital will flow into these regions from the more 
developed ones, in order to take advantage of the reduced costs and rising 
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unemployment there. Weakened demand and rising unemployment, especially 
in the relatively high-skill public sector, may instead create tendencies for out-
migration of a brain-drain type, thus lowering productivity in these regions and 
evaporating any investment incentives accruing from unemployment. A 
Myrdalian-type circular causation effect may well kick-in, at least in the most 
heavily affected regions, where internal demand recedes the most.  
Rational economic behaviour under heightened risk may come to add to this 
circular effect. It is well-established in the finance literature (see Kimball, 
1990; Eechhoudt and Schlesinger, 1994) that increased income risk raises 
financial prudence, leading to a disproportionate decline in risk-taking 
(nationally).45 Recently, Broll et al (2010) have followed the spatial 
implications of this, showing that rising financial prudence leads to greater 
concentration of private capital, so that investments are redirected to areas of 
high agglomeration, even if risks are distributed more or less evenly across 
space. For Greece this suggests that, as the austerity measures intensify 
economic contraction and uncertainty, ‘prudent’ businesses will cut down on 
their investments in areas of low demand, weak physical connectivity and poor 
infrastructure – even irrespective of the actual size of the negative demand 
shock experienced in each region – and in contrast concentrate their 
investments in the main metropolitan areas and especially in the Capital, where 
large segments of the population, as well as of political power, reside. Thus, 
investment in peripheral areas, such as those in the less developed northern and 
north-western parts of the country, will decline further.  
Similarly, with rising unemployment nationally, mobile workers will have an 
incentive to concentrate in the big urban agglomerations, to benefit from the 
larger pool of jobs available there. In fact, migration towards the main urban 
centres may increase even if unemployment rises faster there than in the 
periphery, as long as disinvestment and subsiding demand reduces productivity 
                                                 
45
 This is the same process that led to the liquidity crisis in 2008, as heightened risk led to a 
disproportionate reduction in lending.  
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faster in peripheral areas.46 As a result, economic activity will become 
increasingly concentrated in better-off areas, areas with specialisations in 
internationally competitive sectors (mainly tourism) and areas of higher 
agglomeration (mainly the broader region of Athens and a few other 
metropolitan areas).  
If such a circular causation mechanism is put in place, then a further weakening 
of the economic potential of the less prosperous regions can follow in a rather 
short period of time – in a way that, even if demand differences are restored, 
the cumulative process of regional differentiation may remain. Consistent with 
the Kaldorian view of cumulative causation (but also with the endogenous 
growth literature for knowledge- rather than demand-generated spillovers), a 
drop in the mass (Angeriz et al, 2008) or density (Ciccone and Hall, 1996) of 
economic activity in these regions will lead to an increasingly slower rate of 
productivity growth. Slower productivity growth will lead to a relative 
reduction in economic efficiency and in private returns (wages and profits), 
thus reinforcing the tendency for out-migration (brain-drain) and disinvestment 
(capital flight). As a result, growth differentials between the better-off and the 
less well-off regions will tend to become permanent, even if the initial 
conditions that generated them (i.e., the austerity measures) disappear.  
Of course, the extent to which a negative demand shock in any given region 
translates into a more structural demand deficiency, which may then trigger a 
cumulative causation effect, depends at least partly on the economic resilience 
of this region (Pike et al, 2010). More diversified regions and those specialising 
in products of national or international comparative advantage will be in a 
better position to overcome the negative effects of the national austerity 
measures. In the context of the Greek economy, this adds another reason to 
                                                 
46
 There are two theoretical arguments supporting this. On the one hand, owing to Marshallian 
externalities attributed to labour-pooling, a higher density of jobs tends to create lower unemployment 
durations thus increasing the probability of finding a job for any given level of unemployment. On the 
other, consistent with the Harris-Todaro model of urban migration, faster productivity growth in the 
urban centres induces migration from the periphery, even if one assumes that wage movements allow 
the peripheral labour markets to clear.  
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believe that the impact of the austerity measures may have a cumulative effect 
of the type discussed above. With depressed demand keeping wage and price 
inflation nationally at low levels (barring the temporary effects of tax rises on 
inflation), thus producing effectively an internal devaluation, the regions 
specialising in tourism and manufacturing exports (mainly Athens, 
Thessaloniki, the South Aegean and Crete, i.e., those least affected by the 
composition effect), may benefit from an external stimulus to their economies 
(increased exports and international tourist arrivals).47 In contrast, in regions 
with weak export bases (such as those in the northern and western peripheries) 
an internal devaluation will be felt more as an increase in relative import prices 
(in purchasing power terms) – thus further strengthening the circular 
mechanism discussed above.48  
Overall, in the scenario presented above, a clear disparity can emerge between 
the higher-income and less affected by the austerity measures economies of the 
south and the less dynamic and more heavily affected economies of the north. 
Of course, if such a scenario materialises, it will not be solely the outcome of 
the geographical asymmetry of the austerity measures, but rather of the 
interaction between this asymmetry and the regional imbalances and weak 
equilibration mechanisms that characterise Greece. The point made with this 
scenario is that, with collapsing demand nationally, an additional negative 
shock directed to the least competitive and perhaps least resilient regions may 
trigger a cumulative process of divergence, with investment and external 
demand concentrating in the more extrovert and dynamic regions of the south, 
especially in and around Athens, at the expense, perhaps even in absolute 
terms, of the more heavily affected periphery. In such a case, Greece’s regional 
                                                 
47
 It should be acknowledged, however, that the tourism industry is also extremely sensitive to 
problems of political stability. For example, the recent political upheaval and widespread street protests 
have contributed to a slow-down of tourist arrivals and spending, which is partly reflected in the rising 
unemployment in the region of the South Aegean.  
48
 Although an internal devaluation may in theory improve demand for agricultural products produced 
in these regions, this is unlikely to have a substantial effect as agricultural production is highly 
distorted by CAP subsidies and the structure of production (small farms, low mechanisation) is such 
that export penetration is constrained more by technology and information problems (including access 
to distribution networks abroad) than by uncompetitive prices.  
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imbalances will become even more acute, putting serious questions on the 
country’s ability to achieve balanced and sustainable growth even after it 
recovers from its current crisis. 
 
5. Conclusions 
An embedded north-south asymmetry in the Eurozone, together with the 
chronic misreporting of, and lack of prudence in, public finances in Greece, 
have led to an unprecedented fiscal crisis in the country as the global financial 
crisis unfolded. Threatened by a seemingly inevitable default, the country is 
obliged, counter-intuitively, to implement a series of austerity measures that 
come to add dearly to the recession already experienced by the economy. The 
situation does not afford Greece the luxury, or time, to devise measures that 
will address issues of regional imbalance and spatial fairness. Despite that, in 
this paper we have argued that the spatial implications of the crisis and the 
austerity measures may be too big and, more importantly, may have too 
structural a character to be ignored – even at the current conjunction.  
On the basis of the direct compositional effects of the austerity measures, three 
types of regions can be broadly identified. Some northern and north-western 
regions are out to lose the most, with a projected reduction in real disposable 
incomes (accounting also for the impact of indirect taxation) of well above 
10%. Other peripheral and less developed regions of the country (including the 
non-metropolitan parts of Central Greece and Central Macedonia) will 
probably experience a negative shock closer to 8-9% of disposable incomes. 
Finally, the more central and high-income regions of Attica, Thessaloniki, 
Crete and the south Aegean will experience a significantly smaller shock, 
perhaps in the area of 6-7%. The overall effect will be an amplification of 
existing inequalities, with the least developed regions suffering the most and 
the most dynamic regions suffering the least. Owing to the weak cross-regional 
adjustment mechanisms in Greece and the existing imbalances in regional 
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structures, it is possible that under specific conditions the asymmetry of these 
effects will trigger a cumulative process of divergence and further regional 
differentiation.  
Of course, whether such a process materialises depends crucially on the 
implicit assumptions made above about how the austerity measures, combined 
as they are with the already strong impact of the recession, will alter the 
behaviour of risk-averse economic agents, thus transforming a temporary 
asymmetric demand shock into a permanent cumulative causation mechanism. 
Although we have no way of testing for the validity of these assumptions at this 
stage, we contend that they do not appear to be particularly implausible. In this 
sense, devising regionally-sensitive austerity policies, even if this appears as a 
tough call for policy in the current climate, may be essential in order for the 
country not to compromise its future spatial-economic cohesion. 
As with elsewhere (e.g., Rowthorn, 2010, for the UK), it appears that policy 
measures that can correct for the observed asymmetries while being consistent 
with the fiscal consolidation programme can in fact be found. Domestically, 
this would require a shift of the fiscal consolidation efforts towards raising 
revenues from income taxation (of a much more progressive character), which 
can be fairer not only in a geographical but also in a societal sense. Given the 
scale of tax-evasion in the country, however, the government may find it 
difficult to raise revenues from this source even with a more progressive 
income tax system. In any case, the new income tax scales introduced recently 
do not appear to have a strong redistributive effect – at least not in the context 
of declining incomes across the entire distribution (Matsaganis and Leventi, 
2011) – while the recently announced reduction of the non-taxable income 
threshold will obviously have the opposite effect. The expenditure cuts that 
come largely to substitute for this inability to target the right incomes, end up 
affecting disproportionately the most vulnerable regions and income groups, 
thus compromising social and economic cohesion in the country and creating 
additional spatial asymmetries that will be hard to rectify also in the future.  
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Interestingly, in this context, an externally-supported fiscal stimulus, with an 
easing in the flow of Cohesion Funds in the country and a mechanism for 
national debt restructuring within the Eurozone, could well be a solution to this. 
The very recent developments, with the mini-political crisis and the cabinet 
reshuffle in June 2011, seem to have started to push this issue of pro-growth 
measures more centrally in the policy agenda (Strupczewski, 2011). Despite 
this, the Greek government still appears too slow in seizing the opportunity and 
placing the issue of complementary pro-growth measures in the agenda of 
future fiscal consolidation negotiations; while it shows so far no evidence for 
an attention to the spatial and, through this, developmental dimension. Perhaps 
due to the urgency of the situation, in the current conjunction emphasis remains 
centred on inducing structural reforms, not stimulating growth through public 
investment, as the objective is still very much the restoration of Greece’s (and 
EMU’s) credibility against the markets. Adherence to the painful austerity 
measures that Greece has committed to is still seen as a major condition for 
this. It remains to be seen whether policy-making, both in Greece and in 
Europe, will manage to find a balance between the two objectives (credibility – 
recovery) in a way that does not compromise the economic prospects and 
socio-spatial cohesion of the country – and even the legitimisation of the EMU 
project at large. 
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From indecision to fast-track privatisations:  
Can Greece still do it? 
Nicos Christodoulakis#  
 
Abstract 
The paper explains how the collapse of growth after 2008 in combination with soaring 
public and external deficits led to the escalation of Greek debt, while the 
Government’s delay to respond to the crisis increased the cost of borrowing and 
necessitated the bail-out agreement with the IMF and the European Union. One year 
later, Greece is struggling to harness fiscal deficits still amid a deep recession and 
with rising social tensions.  Debt sustainability is not yet ensured and another trance of 
loans is negotiated under heavy new terms and conditions, including higher taxes and 
extensive privatizations of public companies and property. The paper discusses the 
main failures of the bail-out agreement and why the lack of growth has so far 
undermined stabilization efforts. As an alternative, the paper suggests that a modest 
return to growth in combination with a moderate program of fast-track privatizations 
can substantially improve the prospects of debt sustainability. In light of the recent 
debate on the European Stability Mechanism, the paper suggests that the bail-out 
facility should avoid the debt seniority condition, so that Greece returns to normal 
market borrowing after 2013 without raising new fears of haircuts on private sector 
obligations. 
 
Keywords: Debt, Fiscal Policy, Greece 
JEL Classification: H60, H61 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Last year the European Union (EU) in coordination with the IMF and the European 
Central Bank (ECB) launched a rescue operation to salvage the faltering Greek 
economy and - by doing so - insulate its frightening reverberations from reaching the 
banking system of the Euro area. One year after the EU-IMF bailout, Greece 
continues to be haunted by the specter of insolvency amid a deep recession - third year 
                                                 
#
 I have benefited from various comments in seminars at the LSE Workshop on Greece organized by the 
Hellenic Observatory, November 2010, and in the AUEB-DIEES Research Day, June 2011, where an earlier 
version of the paper was presented. Proposals on how to deal with the Greek debt and views expressed in this 
article are solely those of the author, without implicating or representing any other person or organization. 
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in a row - that has fed waves of social unrest and severely undercut the political 
stamina for accelerating reforms. In the meanwhile, Ireland and Portugal were 
subjected to similar programs to stem a peripheral debt crisis and this has made 
Greece to be part of a more general problem in the Eurozone and worldwide. 
 As witnessed by an ever-growing volume of CDS transactions on Greece defaulting, 
current market opinions are overwhelmed by the view that Greek debt is not 
sustainable and that sooner or later the country is bound to renege on obligations. 
Many in Greece and abroad are nervously wondering whether a Deus ex machina is 
going to appear or else the end of the game is quickly approaching. 
In spite of the doom-saying literature, the present paper adopts a different line. It 
argues that the current lack of sustainability in Greek debt dynamics, rather than being 
a long time predicament, it was mostly the result of recent fiscal episodes of dramatic 
proportions, combined with the global recession after 2008 and further exacerbated by 
a stunning delay in taking timely and appropriate action. The implication is that Greek 
debt could be stabilized again, if drastic action is undertaken by implementing fast-
track privatizations to repay part of the obligations and help growth to resume. This is 
broadly in line with currently negotiated new terms and conditions between Greece 
and the bail-out partners, but a number of alternative assumptions are introduced 
regarding feasibility and likely effects of the new policies. 
With hindsight, the mechanics of excessive debt accumulation are easy to explain. The 
main reason for the fiscal collapse was the fact that primary surpluses at first were 
practically vanished after 2004 and then turned to big deficits after 2008 as a result of 
a steep rise in public consumption and a collapse in revenues. As a result of the global 
crisis, public debt increased further by the emergency finance that was deemed 
necessary to safeguard the smooth functioning of the Greek banking system. In a final 
stroke, the economy started falling into recession and a typical debt trap was created 
causing the debt to output ratio to explode, thus raising serious doubts on long term 
sustainability.  
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The delay in decision-making both in Greece and the European Union was another 
factor for making the situation uncontrollable. Although the crisis was looming all 
year 2009, no serious fiscal action was undertaken by the authorities until borrowing 
activity was no longer feasible and the country asked for the rescue operation in April 
2010. The bail-out calmed the bond holders in foreign banks, but ushered in a new 
period of domestic challenges. 
Despite the huge loan facility of €110bn granted to Greece for a period of two years, 
the bail-out decision was not sufficiently detailed and effective so as to produce a 
quick rehabilitation of public finances. The terms and conditions set in the agreement 
(commonly named as the ‘Memorandum’) envisaged restoring sustainability by 
increasing taxation and pushing for structural reforms so as to eventually invigorate 
competitiveness and lead the economy on a growth path. One year after its 
implementation, the Memorandum is hardly considered as successful or adequate. The 
reason is that with recession unabated, stabilizing the debt-to-output ratio requires 
enormous primary surpluses which the Government will find increasingly difficult to 
generate in an environment of rising social pressure and political fatigue. As a matter 
of fact, Greece is currently negotiating a new trance of financial facility from IMF-EU 
to cover its borrowing needs after 2012, in exchange for a new round of policy 
reforms and extensive privatizations as described in the Medium Term Fiscal Program 
(MTFP).49 At this stage, it is crucial that the importance of getting the economy out of 
recession is not missed for yet another time and it is encouraging that EU has recently 
started, at last, to explore the possibility of releasing more structural funds for Greece 
and other indebted countries in order to stimulate economic activity.  
Restoring growth will have a substantial descaling effect on the debt to output ratio, 
which can be brought further down through quick privatizations. In this case, the debt-
to-GDP ratio is found to be immediately stabilized and then reduced to levels close to 
those before the 2008 crisis. For such an outcome to be sufficient to calm markets it is 
advisable that new uncertainties are not fuelled with regards to the loan repayment 
                                                 
49
 At the time of writing the paper, the Medium Term Fiscal Program (MTFP) was submitted to Parliament. It 
was later approved on 29 June 2011. 
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provisions envisaged by the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). Practically, this 
implies that the EU loans are repaid without seniority clauses after the Mechanism 
becomes operational in 2013.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the origins of the 
fiscal crisis in the years before and after the global crisis in 2008. Section 3 develops a 
simple theoretical model to portray the effects of policy indecision on the Greek yield 
curve and thus explain why the borrowing capacity was exhausted and the country 
asked for the bail-out. Section 4 assesses some critical parts of the IMF-EU 
conditionality program and examines how alternative policies could enhance growth 
and restore solvency. Section 5 concludes with some policy suggestions concerning 
the way that ESM is going to apply. 
 
2. A tale of twin deficits and recession 
The explosiveness of Greek finances had three causes: prolonged deficits during good 
times, prolonged indecision during crisis time and prolonged recession that eroded the 
prospects of fiscal rehabilitation. To describe how the situation reached such an 
uncontrollable state, the period following Greece’s participation to EMU in 2000 is 
divided into three sub-intervals: it begins with 2000-2003 to represent the first four 
years under the common currency, continues with 2004-2008 that started with the 
Olympic Games and ended with the global crisis, while the third includes years 2009 
and 2010 in which Greece was driven out of international markets and sought the 
IMF-EU bailout. Table 1 summarizes some key macroeconomic and fiscal variables 
so that one can see how they were deteriorating from one period to another. 
As depicted in Fig. 1, Greek public debt was over or close to 100% of GDP for most 
of the last twenty years. When the economy was hit by both big deficits and deep 
recession after the 2008 crisis, an upward surge in debt made the already high stock to 
get out of control. To examine which factors primarily affected the debt-to-output 
ratio the following accounting formula is used: 
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1( ) [ ] ( )b ipay nb surplus privat other−∆ = − − + +
   (1) 
where (b) is the ratio of debt to GDP and ∆ denotes the period difference. The debt-
augmenting factors are the interest payments (ipay) and various one-off obligations 
(other) such as defense orders or payments of loan guarantees to public enterprises, all 
expressed as ratios to output. Apart from the primary surpluses, the debt-to-output 
ratio is reduced by the amount of privatizations (privat) and is adjusted downwards by 
the effect that nominal GDP growth (n) has on the previous period debt-to-output ratio 
( 1b− ). The profile of the above factors during the last decade is shown in Fig 2. 
Expressed as a ratio to output, interest payments experienced a rise since 2008, but 
were nevertheless kept below the level they had at the beginning of the decade when 
Greek debt was regularly serviced without any concern of default. The one-off items 
did not show any major change either, and in any case they were of a magnitude 
around 1% of GDP per year. It is, thus, obvious that the main debt-augmenting factors 
have been the reversal of primary surpluses into deficits, the decline in privatisations 
and the disappearance of growth as discussed below. 
 
2.1 More fiscal deficits and no growth 
The fiscal snowball started with a gradual fall in revenues after 2003 and ended up 
with a rocketing expenditure in 2009. As shown in Fig. 3 and Table 1, revenues fell by 
an average of 4.30% of GDP per annum in the post-Olympics period, as a result of a 
major cut in corporate tax rate from 35% to 25% in 2005 and extensive inattention on 
the collection of VAT. Public consumption (i.e. excluding public investments) was 
basically kept under control and rose by a marginal 0.50% of GDP in the second 
period. Public investment deficit was on the rise in the years of Olympic preparation 
reaching 3.70% of GDP, but then declined below 2.50% after the Games.  
Primary surpluses were at an average of 2.54% of GDP and led to a mild reduction of 
the debt to output ratio by 4.6 GDP units in 2000-2003, but in the second period they 
turned to deficits of -0.80% of GDP in average and ushered in the period of debt-
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escalation. In 2007 a spiral of elections and fiscal uncontrollability was set in motion. 
In the summer that year the Government, worrying for the rising deficits and 
paralyzed from wild forest fires across the country, sought a fresh mandate. Despite 
being awarded with a clear victory, no action was taken afterwards to redress public 
finances and debt continued to accumulate. At the end of 2008 public debt was up by 
10.71 GDP units as compared with the situation in 2004, thus severely limiting the 
room for policies aiming to combat the effects of the global crisis that erupted that 
year.   
In the aftermath of the crunch, the Greek Government remained for a long period 
indecisive on what exactly to do in the fiscal front. Swaying between fiscal stimulus to 
raise demand and higher taxation to control the deficit, weakened from internal 
divisions and subjected to a major defeat in the European elections of June 2009, it 
finally opted for yet another election in October 2009. By letting policy inaction to 
mix with pre-electoral largesse in a last-ditch attempt to serve special interest groups, 
fiscal consequences were stunning: public consumption was pumped up by almost 6 
percentage units of GDP in a single year reaching 27% of GDP at the end of 2009, 
while revenues went tumbling. The deficit of General Government initially set to be 
6.7% of GDP for that year, was revised to 11% in June, to 12.4% in October 2009 and 
finally jumped to 15.4% of GDP by the end of the year triggering the fiscal collapse.  
The second front of neglect was privatization policy. In the past, proceeds form 
privatizations used to repay part of public debt both before and after country’s 
accession to EMU. Proceeds peaked at 3.4% of GDP in 1999, but subsequently 
remained below 2% as a result of the capital markets contraction after the dot.com 
bubble, the global recession in 2003 and the reform-fatigue that prevailed after 
EMU.50 The privatisation process was further slowed down after the elections of 2004 
and proceeds surfaced below 1% of GDP per year, despite the fact that the then 
Government had made a strong pre-electoral pledge for far-reaching changes in the 
economy and a radical restructuring of the public sector. The privatisation process 
                                                 
50
 For an extensive discussion of privatisations and reforms in Greece over the period 1990-2008 see 
Christodoulakis (2011). 
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nearly ceased in 2007 and, proceeds turned negative after 2008 as the Government had 
to finance the emergency capitalisation of Greek banks, thus directly augmenting 
public debt; see Fig. 4. 
Finally, the explosive dynamics of the Greek debt-to-output ratio were crucially 
affected by the disappearance of nominal GDP growth. With a stock of debt serially 
above nominal GDP, its ratio to output was in the past substantially diminishing every 
year as a result of real growth rates around 4% and inflation rates exceeding 3% per 
annum in average. As shown in Fig. 2 the GDP effect was so strong that it more than 
compensated for the interest payments until 2008. The output effect disappears 
completely after 2009 when recession deepens and GDP growth stops in nominal 
terms.  
 
2.2 External deficits 
Before 2008 Greece was able to borrow at a cost exceeding the German 10-year bund 
by no more than half percentage point, but after the crisis the cost was raised sharply 
and the reason was not just the swollen state finances. Against conventional views, 
sovereign spreads after the 2008 crunch also peaked in economies with very low 
public debt or deficits, only because they happened to have large external 
imbalances.51 The effect is by now well-documented52 and formal evidence covering 
exclusively the Euro area economies is presented in Appendix A for the period 
considered in this paper.  
The estimation reveals that Current Account deficits exert a strong upward pressure in 
borrowing spreads, comparable to that due to public debt and deficits. As Greece 
happened to have the worst record among Euro area countries on all three fronts, it 
came as no surprise to be so badly exposed to the credit crisis and the first to seek for 
                                                 
51
 Such as, for example, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and the Baltic countries. For an interesting discussion of the 
effects of the credit crunch on emerging markets with large Current Account deficits see Shelburne (2008). 
52
 Similar studies for different periods include, among others, Alexopoulou et al. (2009), Attinasi et al. (2009), 
and Barrios et al. (2009). 
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a bail-out. Greece chronically suffered from a Current Account deficit that was around 
Euro -8bn or -5.55% of GDP in the first period of examination; see Fig. 5 and Table 1. 
After a strong import boom in the post-Olympics euphoria the deficit widened to Euro 
-34.8bn, or 14.55% of GDP in 2008, by far the largest external imbalance worldwide 
as a proportion to output. Though it was manifold higher than in the beginning of the 
decade, neither a counter-cyclical action was considered domestically53, nor any voice 
of concern was raised by European authorities.  
The same neglect was shown for other countries as well, as attitudes in Europe and 
elsewhere held at that time that the cost of borrowing reflects exclusively the fiscal 
situation in each particular country, since Balance of Payments crises are comfortably 
ruled out in a monetary union.54 It was only in the aftermath of the crisis that policy 
bodies in the European Union started emphasising the adverse effects that external 
imbalances may have on the sustainability of the common currency.55 In fact, Greece 
was perceived as an existential  threat to the Eurozone not just because of its own 
internal and external imbalances, but - as Lachman (2010) dramatically put it -  
“rather …because similar imbalances are shared to a disturbingly high degree by the 
very much larger Spanish economy as well as by the economies of Portugal and 
Ireland”. 
 
3. The cost of prolonged indecision  
As if the perilous state of public finances and external imbalances were not enough, 
the situation was further aggravated by the lack of appropriate action to tackle the 
deficits both before and after the occurrence of the global crisis. Despite the fiscal 
                                                 
53
 In fact, the contrary happened: responding to the pleas of car dealers who saw their sales shrinking because of 
recession, the Government decided in early 2009 to reduce surcharges on imported luxury vehicles, hence 
increasing conspicuous consumption in the middle of the crisis.  
54
 Even huge external disparities in the euro area went unnoticed from a policy point of view; for example 
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) were suggesting a benign neglect towards the excessive deficits. For a 
discussion of the problem see Christodoulakis (2009). 
55
 See for example European Commission Report, (2009). For a discussion on the external imbalances in the 
Eurozone countries and how they reflect structural shifts between traded and non-traded sectors see 
Christodoulakis and Sarantidis (2011). 
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strain at home and the alarming signals that international recession was approaching, 
the Government appeared - even in mid-2008 - fully complacent with the situation, 
claiming that the Greek economy is sufficiently “fortressed” and will remain immune 
from the reverberations of international shocks.  
When the global crisis erupted in September 2008, the Government remained for a 
long time ambivalent as to whether to implement a harsh program to stem fiscal 
deterioration or expand public spending to fight off the prospect of recession. A final 
compromise included a demand-push stimulus package at the end of the year, 
combined with a bank rescue plan of €5bn and a pledge to raise extra revenues if 
necessary. Unsurprisingly, the first two were quickly implemented, while the latter 
was forgotten soon afterwards. The public was quick to realize that no serious action 
is considered and its confidence to the Government eroded sharply. The ruling party 
suffered a major defeat in the elections for the European Parliament in June 2009 and 
shortly afterwards called for an emergency general election in October 2009. 
 
3.1 The paradox of emergency 
The official justification of calling an early election in less than two years from the 
previous one was that the country needed a tougher economic policy to combat the 
crisis. But, in contrast to the single excuse, the public experienced a double paradox: 
the first occurred with the incumbent party that was seeking re-election to apply fiscal 
consolidation but, in the meanwhile, was engaged in a spending spree of gigantic 
proportions in order to please its constituencies and stave off the prospect of defeat.56 
Predictably, primary expenditure at the end of 2009 neared €62bn, twice the size of 
2003, while revenues dropped in a single year by €-2.3bn or 1% of GDP.57 Embarking 
on a similar paradoxical line, the main opposition party was on one hand promising to 
rescue the economy from imminent bankruptcy while it was at the same time 
declaring that “money exist” (“lefta yparhoun”) and are sufficient to finance an 
                                                 
56
 The damaging effects of the incumbent’s complacency around elections are analysed in Skouras and 
Christodoulakis (2011) with a case study on Greece. 
57
 Details on how spending was ballooned in 2009 are given in Christodoulakis (2010).   
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expansion of social programs and re-nationalise key public companies that were 
previously privatised.  
As a result of the multiple ambiguities, the new incumbent emerged from the elections 
far from being convinced - let alone prepared - to follow a program of drastic fiscal 
consolidation, despite achieving a landslide victory and causing a harmful split in the 
opposition party. Trapped in its own clichés of pre-electoral rhetoric, the new 
Government was slow to grasp the criticality of the situation and act swiftly. Even 
when the budget deficit was reported to the European authorities to frog leap at 12.4% 
of GDP, the Government was publicly vowing to honor pre-election promises and 
continued to vehemently exclude privatizations from its policy options.58  
Two months after the elections, the Government was still ambivalent until a chain of 
events was put in motion in December 2009 after a rating agency downgraded the 
Greek economy: the ECB promptly warned that the collateral status of Greek 
sovereign bonds may end shortly, this sparked a massive wave of credit default swaps 
on Greek debt, borrowing costs started going further up for both short and long term 
maturities, and Greece was put on the merciless spotlight of worldwide attention.  
International markets already worrying about the escalation of fiscal deficits, now 
turned suspicious about the Government’s willingness to deal with the situation and 
declined to increase lending to Greece. As shown in Fig. 6, the yield curve was, month 
after month, moving upwards and becoming less steep, thus diminishing the prospects 
of cheap short term borrowing as well. By April 2009 the curve was completely flat 
with all maturities at such a prohibitively high yield that Greece had to turn to the bail-
out.  
3.2 A simple framework of indecision 
In order to analyze how fiscal indecision that prevailed after the October 2009 
elections led to the gradual exclusion of Greece from the bond markets, a simple 
                                                 
58
 The Budget Plan submitted in autumn 2009 for fiscal year 2010 included new transfers to low-income 
households and an expansion of public expenditure. No revenues from privatizations were envisaged and, as a 
matter of fact, no privatization took place whatsoever until the time of writing this paper.  
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model of issuing one and two-period bonds is adopted. Suppose that there is a 
situation where revenues (L) net of primary spending are not sufficient to meet the 
amount of interest payments (D) due in period j. A fiscal gap (φ ) is defined as the 
proportion of uncovered obligations in each period, i.e.  
-
1j j jj
j j
D L L
D D
φ = = −
     (2) 
The market believes with probability ( jp ) that the government will undertake 
additional fiscal action sufficient to cover all existing obligations or else will remain 
inactive with probability (1 jp− ). Fiscal resolve in the two periods may differ and 
probabilities are respectively parameterized as 
1 2(1 )    and   p pθ θ λ λ= + − ⋅ =
    (3) 
where θ denotes the degree of commitment varying within [0,1] and 1λ <   since fiscal 
effort is likely to relax later, due to unforeseen difficulties or plain term-fatigue as 
next elections will be approaching. Expected net revenues are given by: 
 (1 )j j j j jF p D p L= + −
     (4) 
The degree of expected haircut in each period is obviously:  
- (1 )j jj j j
j
D F
h p
D
φ= = − ⋅
     (5) 
The no-arbitrage equation for one-period bonds is given by the expression: 
1
1
11 (1 )
1
Rh
r
+
= −
+
      (6) 
where 1R  and   r   are the one-period and the benchmark yields respectively.  
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A haircut in period 2 may be imposed independently of whether or not another has 
been applied in the first period. Thus, the no-arbitrage condition for the 2-period bond 
is given by  
2 2
1 1 2 2
11 (1 ) (1 )(1 )
1 (1 )
R Rh h h
r r
+
= − + − −
+ +
    (7) 
where 2R  is the yield on the 2-period bond and 2h  the degree of expected haircut in 
the second period. Yields are then obtained as functions of expected haircuts as:  
1
1
1 1
1
rR
h
+
= −
−
     (8) 
1
2 2
2
1
1 111
1 1 1
h hrR
r h r
−
 
− −+ 
= + −  + − +   
    (9) 
Recalling (5) it is easy to see how the yield differential is affected by the degree of 
fiscal resolve in the two periods, i.e. 
2 1 2 1
1 2
( ) ( )0   and   0 R R R R
p p
∂ − ∂ −
> <
∂ ∂
   (10) 
The above expressions imply that the yield curve becomes steeper (flatter) with an 
increasing (decreasing) fiscal resolve in the first period, represented by a rise (fall) in 
1p
. The reverse is the case with a change in the fiscal resolve in the second period, 
represented by 2p . Τhe following cases are examined:  
(i) Front-loaded action (θ=1): In this case 1 1p =  and the market expects that 
appropriate action to meet current obligations will be undertaken immediately. The 
implication is that 1 0h =  and 2 0h >  and this leads to an upward yield curve with 
1  R r′ = and 
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(ii) Complacency (θ=0): In this case 1 2 1p p λ= = < , effort is below requirements in 
both periods and expected haircuts are now 1 2 0h h= > . Expressions (8) and (9) give: 
1
1 2 2
11
r hR R R
h
+
′′ ′′ ′= = >
−
     (12) 
The yield curve moves upwards and becomes flat. Intermediate cases 0<θ<1 are 
similarly examined. Starting from a steep position when full-scale fiscal action is 
expected, the yield curve is becoming flatter as resolve is waning away. A graphical 
illustration of how the yield curve is upwards shifting with indecision is given in Fig. 
7. 
The simple model reflects with surprising accuracy the situation of diminishing 
resolve from the last quarter of 2009 through the first one in 2010. Following Roth et 
al (2011), an index of public trust measured by the Eurobarometer is used to reflect 
the prevailing sentiment on whether the Government is considered capable to tackle 
the problems of the economy.  
As shown in Fig. 8, the index of trust rose sharply in the autumn 2009 when the Greek 
Government was angrily reporting that public deficit was found to be even higher than 
expected and vowed to take all necessary measures to tackle it. Though not spelt out 
yet, the public drew the conclusion that swift fiscal action is under way and this 
explains the relative calm of the markets before the upswing in December 2009. Using 
the theoretical framework, the high-resolve expectations are captured by letting θ=1 
and getting 1 1p =  and a steep yield curve as shown in the bottom of Fig. 7.   
In real-life Fig. 6 the yield curve was indeed steep and upward slopping right after the 
elections in October 2009 and short-term maturities were traded at yields substantially 
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lower than the ten-year maturities.59 But as no serious action was undertaken in 
practice, the index of trust started falling again and in spring 2010 it was approaching 
the same level as when the crisis erupted in September 2008. The public was 
gradually adjusting its expectations downwards, thus driving the probability of resolve 
to the complacency level, 1 1p λ→ < . The curve was becoming increasingly flatter and 
Greece was borrowing at an increasing cost in all maturities until it was finally driven 
out of the markets. 
 
4. The IMF-EU Memorandum:  From unwillingness to misfiring 
Another factor that further aggravated the situation was the unwillingness and lack of 
contingency plans by the European authorities to react promptly60 to the rapid 
isolation of Greece from international bond markets. A clear manifestation of 
misjudging the situation took place when the European Central Bank refused to grant 
collateral status61 for all denominations of Greek sovereign bonds supplied by 
commercial banks in exchange of liquidity. As this came a few days after Greece was 
downgraded by the rating agencies in December 2009, it sparked new fears that a 
default was imminent. Though in March 2010 the ECB finally conceded that Greek 
sovereign bonds will enjoy full collateral treatment for another three years regardless 
of rating status, it was by then too late for the prevailing view of Greece being at the 
brink of insolvency to be reversed.  
At the same time EU authorities were sternly refusing the option of letting the IMF to 
intervene in a Euro-area country and suggested that a new fiscal program launched in 
                                                 
59
 It is still unexplained why the debt management strategy of the time neglected this window of opportunity 
and instead concentrated on borrowing long and expensive paper. In contrast, Ireland seized the opportunity to 
borrow short and cheap after the crisis in 2008 creating a credit shield against the risk of going to the markets in 
adverse conditions. 
60
 This is in contrast with the readiness shown in the cases of Hungary, Latvia and Romania that were quickly 
assisted by IMF and European Union funds in 2008 and 2009. 
61
 After the credit crunch in 2008, the ECB invited private banks of member states to obtain low-cost liquidity 
using sovereign bonds rated A+ or above as collateral securitization. De Grauwe (2010) commenting on the 
extension of bonds collateralisation argued that the decision of the ECB was “… a major contribution … to 
reducing the risk of spillovers to other markets”. 
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January 2010 by the Greek Government would be sufficient to restore confidence. 
Their  stance was dissipated only when it became clear that the difficulties in servicing 
the Greek debt might quickly propagate into the banking system of other European 
states and cause another painful recession in their economies just when they were 
about to exit the previous slump.  
Early slowness was now replaced by hasty orders and conditions that Greece 
implements a Memorandum of ambitious revenue targets and structural changes, 
aiming to ensure fiscal credibility and restore competitiveness and growth. After 
sweeping negotiations, a joint loan of €110bn was finally agreed in May 2010 by the 
EU and the IMF to be granted to Greece to substitute for unreachable market 
borrowing. A brief assessment of the outcome after the first year of implementation is 
given below. 
 
4.1 New taxes, but no new revenues 
With a dithering record on tax collection, the Government rushed in March 2010 to 
raise more revenues by increasing62 the VAT rate from 19% to 21%. Although 
experience from a similar decision to raise the VAT rate by 1% in 2005 suggested that 
the rise is more likely to be used as an excuse to increase prices rather than augment 
revenues, authorities were hoping that recession would this time compensate for the 
fear of inflation. To buttress against increased incentives for VAT appropriation by 
retailers, the Government launched a campaign of receipt-collection and announced 
further measures to beat tax evasion.  
With no evidence of success in the first two months of implementation, the same 
measure was recommended by the Memorandum and in May 2010 the VAT rate was 
set further up to 23%. Once more, projections proved unrealistic and CPI inflation at 
the end of 2010 was rampaging at 4.5% substantially above the level in previous 
years.  
                                                 
62
 In an interesting counterexample, the British Government responding to the post-crisis recession decided to 
reduce the VAT rate by two units in 2008, despite the looming deficits.   
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It is revealing to compare total revenue collection during the 12 months prior to and 
after the implementation of the Memorandum, as shown in Fig. 9. Although revenues 
were enhanced by a lucrative lump-sum tax in exchange of settling previous arrears 
(‘peraiosis’), a heavy increase in fuel tax and a substantial rise in several consumption 
surcharges, net collection remained virtually the same as in the corresponding months 
before the tax storm. As nominal GDP remained stagnant between 2009 and 2010, the 
failure to raise revenues should be solely attributed to the continuing slackness in the 
collection mechanism and the increased incentives to evade it. Liquidity-starving 
retailers were quick to recognize in the VAT increase a new opportunity for cash, 
worth enough to ignore the cost of apprehension. 
With growth plummeting, the economy ended up in a typical stagflation situation with 
fiscal revenues not improving and debt continuing to accumulate.63  
 
4.2 New reforms, but no growth 
The bailout Memorandum included the implementation of structural reforms that 
would reduce various scleroses in the economy, cut red-tape in entrepreneurship, 
shrink public ownership in utilities and improve competitiveness. Such reforms were 
seen as sufficient to bring about growth and achieve the fiscal deficit targets, without 
succumbing to any sort of Keynesian stimulus against the deepening recession.  
In practice however, success has been limited and in any case far from generating 
growth. A major reform took place in the ailing social security system, raising age 
limits, extending backwards the salary base on which pensions are calculated and 
rationalizing the overly abused provisions for early retirements. However, even this 
successful reform did not have any immediate fiscal benefit as savings will mostly 
occur in the future. Ironically, as a result of the reform, several pension funds were 
further burdened by the rush of near-retirement employees in the public sector to take 
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 Mabbet and Schelkle (2010) timely pointed out that “…forcing the besieged state to fiscal contraction makes 
it so much harder, if not impossible to get back on a sustainable path”. 
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advantage of favorable transition clauses and exit service before the new regime is 
applied.  
Ending barriers to entry in a number of activities and vocations was fiercely opposed 
by the insiders and the initial plans were seriously compromised. For example, an 
ambitious and protracted liberalization of lorry licensing was granted a postponement 
for two years, while the lifting of downward price controls in lawyers and dispensing 
chemists was abandoned one day before submitted for parliamentary approval. Not 
surprisingly, reforms were not translated into more growth and, without any other 
supply or demand-driven initiative in sight, the economy experienced an even deeper 
recession in 2010 falling by a further -4.50% of GDP. 
 
4.3 Lower public spending, but no privatisations 
The Memorandum was more successful in curtailing the explosive path of public 
consumption from €62bn in 2009 down to €55.6bn in 2010, through universal pension 
and salary cuts. That was the main reason for bringing the General Government deficit 
down from the ominous 15.4% of GDP in 2009 to around 10.40% of GDP in 2010.64 
But that was achieved at a heavy political cost: given the strong affiliation of public 
unions to the ruling party, the implementation of expenditure cuts caused an 
irrevocable alienation with the Government so that any further application of the same 
kind is unlikely. On the other hand, the more promising front of privatizations 
remained completely inactive, until decisions to speed them up were at last taken in 
mid-2011. 
 
4.4 An alternative path for debt sustainability 
The dynamics of the debt-to-GDP ratio are sensitive to the prospects of growth, and 
three alternative scenaria are presented to show this effect. First, a baseline Scenario 
(A) is obtained in which no explicit action is considered to prompt growth, as has been 
the case so far. According to the official predictions in MTFP recession will continue 
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 The figure is not yet finalized by Eurostat. 
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through 2011 at a rate of -3.80% of real GDP with a dim growth of 0.60% appearing 
only in 2012, while inflation is projected at the particularly low level of 1.10%. In this 
benchmark scenario no privatization is assumed to take place, though deficit targets 
are kept as agreed in the Memorandum. Results are depicted in Table 2 and Fig.10. 
Ddebt is found to escalate near 160% of GDP in the next two years before declining 
slowly after 2014.  
Frightened by such a bleak prospect, the Government succumbed to pressures from 
the IMF and the European Union and announced an ambitious program that includes 
extensive privatizations of public companies and a plan of real-estate development on 
public property.65 The new Government program aims at collecting an amount of 
€50bn during the period 2011-2015, or roughly 4% of GDP per annum. Proceeds of 
the program will be earmarked for buying back debt.  
Despite the strong rhetoric, the above target should be viewed with caution for two 
reasons. First because, as history suggests, privatizations were seldom popular in 
Greece and it was only in the run-up to EMU that the Government decided to invite 
private investors to participate in the ownership of public companies. The second 
reason is that privatizations were virtually abandoned during the last two years and for 
the program to be put in motion again a careful planning will be required. It is thus 
questionable if in the present circumstances of recession, widespread industrial action 
and adverse market conditions the target of raising 4% of GDP per annum is realistic, 
unless a major – though yet unlikely - political mobilization takes place to ensure intra 
and inter-party consensus and trade-union cooperation.  
To inquire the effect of growth and privatizations on debt accumulation a less 
ambitious privatization target is considered. An alternative Scenario B assumes that 
proceeds will be at 2% of GDP per annum until 2015 and some growth will be 
generated. This moderate privatization program seems more comparable with 
historical experience than the more aggressive plan as shown in Fig.4. Even at the 
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 The same plan was announced by IMF-EU-ECB representatives in February 2011, but it was fiercely rejected 
by the Government. Later, the Government adopted a more flexible line before finally accepting the initial plan. 
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moderate level privatizations are likely to accelerate restructuring in public enterprises 
and invigorate investment activity both at a company and sector level thus leading to 
some growth.  
Other growth-assisting policies may include direct investment grants financed by EU 
funds and front-loaded EU financing of regional infrastructure as being recently 
proposed by EU authorities. Thus, an amount of €15bn could become immediately 
available for the period until 2013 to fight recession and unemployment. Moreover, in 
order to avoid the concomitant rise in public deficits as required by the national co-
financing clause, the European Commission will consider minimizing or even waiving 
this obligation for an unspecified number of years.66  
Assuming that all the above policies are simultaneously and quickly implemented, a 
more optimistic growth profile is set for Scenario B. In this exercise, growth resumes 
at 0.60% in the current year rather than next67 and then continues as described in the 
baseline Scenario A but one year in advance. For 2014-2015 a growth rate of 3% is 
assumed instead of the baseline 2.3%. Inflation is set equal to the more realistic level 
of 2%, closer to what actually prevailed in the previous years. Deficit targets remain 
intact as in the baseline scenario. As shown in Table 2 and Fig.10 the effect of higher 
nominal growth and privatizations is quite powerful and dynamics of debt change 
considerably.   
In this ‘some-growth-some-privatization’ Scenario, the ratio of debt to GDP is 
immediately stabilized and starts falling from next year, approaching 128% by year 
2015. 
Finally a more optimistic Scenario C is considered by assuming full-fledged 
privatizations as announced by the Government. To make comparisons simple, growth 
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 According to Bloomberg Businessweek (June 23, 2011), European Commission President Jose Manuel 
Barroso will urge leaders to help Greece access billions of Euros in EU development funds to create jobs and 
make its businesses more competitive. If only this had come earlier!  
67
 Suppose, for example, that one third of the 3-year EU funds of Euro 15 bn become quickly operational so that 
an additional amount of Euro 5 bn or 2.20% of GDP is allocated to Greece this year. Assuming a public 
investment multiplier around 2, back-of the envelope-calculations suggest a growth increase of 4.40% that 
would more than compensate for the current -3.80% slump and give a net rate of growth of 0.60% as considered 
in Scenario B. 
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rates, inflation rates and deficit targets are kept the same as in Scenario B without 
taking into account any additional positive externalities from privatizations. In this 
‘some-growth-full-privatizations’ Scenario, a serious decumulation of public debt 
takes place and its ratio to output approaches 118% of GDP in 2015, substantially 
lower than the level it had in 2009. 
One should bear in mind, of course, that such scenaria as above are nothing more than 
mechanical simulations and far from constituting a firm path of events. Especially for 
Scenaria B and C policies should be carefully planned and applied to ensure that 
macroeconomic assumptions on growth and privatizations materialize. Moreover, all 
three scenaria implicitly assume that financing needs are smoothly covered either by 
an extension of the bailout loan as it is currently debated or by a gradual return to 
normal market conditions after 2012. 
 
5. Instead of conclusions: Beware the ESM even gifts bearing 
The paper described some aspects of the debt accumulation in Greece and showed that 
apart from fiscal deterioration, lack of growth and the long delays in deciding the 
appropriate action resulted in exacerbating the initial problem. It is, therefore, 
important for restoring sustainability to ensure that policies capable of assisting 
growth are preferred over those that solely aim to achieve unrealistically high primary 
surpluses by raising taxes and further contracting the economy. Under a combination 
of fast-track privatisations and a modest return to growth, the debt to output ratio can 
be stabilized immediately and decline substantially in the next few years.  
The remaining problem is that such an outcome presupposes that a smooth financing 
of borrowing needs is secured. This, however, cannot as yet be taken for granted 
before the decisions by EU on another €100bn of loans are finalized. Moreover, the 
new loan should be contracted at the previous terms and conditions of the bail-out 
agreement without being subjected to the still provisional form of the European 
Stability Mechanism (ESM). Otherwise the markets, in anticipation of the more 
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complicated criteria on which a continuation of assistance will be considered by ESM, 
might retain their doubts on the applicability and adequacy of the new loan. The 
reason is that ESM introduces seniority status for repaying the loans granted by 
European states. 
As it stands, ESM will be enacted in June 2013 and will have two new responsibilities 
over the currently operational mechanism of European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF). First it will undertake a systematic assessment of fiscal sustainability in each 
particular country and, in case of need, it will provide liquidity funds at a preferred 
creditor status.68 Second, if servicing the debt is found to be beyond the country’s 
capacity, there will be an appropriate “haircut” on private sector holdings under a new 
framework of Collective Action Clauses (CACs).   
Although the mechanism was conceived to calm uncertainty in the bond markets, 
especially with regards to the indebted periphery, the new provisions of seniority 
generated a fresh tide of worries. Sovereign spreads rather than being reduced were 
driven further up and analysts explained this counter-intuitive response by pointing to 
the perplexities involved in applying CACs in a two-tier debt.69 
With regards to Greece, two questions on the applicability of ESM are critical: 
(i) Will ESM underwrite the current bailout loan of €110bn on the same conditions 
envisaged in the Memorandum or is it going to revise the terms and, if so, in 
which direction? This question would not matter, had Greece secured its return 
to markets in 2011 as initially envisaged in the Memorandum. In that case, the 
bailout loan would simply demand regular service costs, no matter if it is 
guarded by ESM or any other institution. However, latest developments 
suggest that Greece is not expected to tap markets before 2012 and the current 
loan should both increase and extended to facilitate regular debt financing for 
as long as needed. 
                                                 
68
 In the European Council, 16-17 Dec 2010, the following decision was made: «In all cases, in order to protect 
taxpayers’ money, and to send a clear message to private creditors that their claims are subordinated to those 
of the official sector, an ESM loan will enjoy preferred creditor status, junior only to IMF loan” (my emphasis); 
European Council (2010), COEUR21. 
69
 See, among others,  Zsolt, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2011), and Vehrkamp (2011),  
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(ii) Will ESM treat any new bailout loan agreed before 2013 as having the 
seniority status or this will apply only to new loans issued after June 2013? 
Eventually, the former may lead to a vicious circle as more senior debt pushes 
market rates upwards and results to seeking more (and from then on senior) 
assistance from ESM. Market rates will then rise even further and growth will 
suffer from lack of credit. Such difficulties could utterly jeopardize any chance 
of Greece returning to normal market conditions for a long period ahead.  
Against such a turn of events three provisions must be considered: 
(a) Seniority status does not apply for the loans agreed upon before 2013 or, in any 
case, prior to ESM becoming operational. 
(b)  An extension of maturities from 5 to 10 years should be announced and 
applied on the IMF-EU loan facility before 2013, in order to alleviate excessive 
pressure on repayment requirements in the transition period until growth 
resumes and the debt to GDP ratio is stabilized. 
(c) Supplementarily, a voluntary extension of maturities on private bold holders70 
could also be examined in a way that it does not constitute a ‘credit event’. 
If such cost-mitigating measures are decided, the optimistic scenaria of higher growth 
and privatizations can become realistic alternatives to the gloomy predictions of 
failure, default and collapse that currently are in a growing use to describe present day 
Greece. 
                                                 
70
 The literature on “if, whether, when and how” the Greek debt will be restructured is accumulating by the day. 
One of the most authoritative analyses on the legal aspects of restructuring is written by Gulati and Buchheit 
(2010). In a sequel paper (2011) the same authors describe how a voluntary extension of maturities held by the 
private sector can take place.  
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Appendix A: Determinants of spreads in the Euro area  
The euro area sovereign spreads are regressed against fiscal balances, public debt and Current 
Account deficits. The sample spans the period 1998:Q1 to 2009:Q4 so as to include the effects of 
global crisis but stopping short of the implementation of the bail-out agreement for Greece. 
Observations are taken for 11 Euro area countries, namely those that joined EMU in the first phase 
plus Greece but minus Luxemburg to avoid small-size effects. All variables are expressed as relative 
to their counterparts of Germany. Results are based on Pool Mean Group estimation (see Pesaran, 
Shin and Smith, 1999) as shown below.   
 
 
 (1) (2) 
Long run coefficients  
Current Account deficit 2.160*** (3.328) 
1.720** 
(2.888) 
Public Debt 1.345*** (3.749) 
1.216*** 
(3.734) 
Fiscal deficit - 1.571** (2.821) 
Short run coefficients   
Speed of adjustment -0.198*** (-10.354) 
-0.223*** 
(-8.029) 
Intercept 
3.906* 
(1.832) 
5.567** 
(2.406) 
Change in Public Debt 1.510** (2.731) 
1.459** 
(2.693) 
Change in Fiscal deficit - -0.256* (-1.933) 
Change in Current Account deficit 0.136 (1.056) 
-0.308 
(-0.693) 
No. of obs. 378 378 
Log likelihood -1314.557 -1289.381 
 
Notes:  t-statistics are presented in brackets. Three asterisks (***) denote significance at 1% level, ** denote 
significance at 5% level and * denotes significance at 10% level. Automatic selection of lags is based on Akaike’s 
information criterion with a maximum of 2 lags. 
Source: Current Account data from IFS. Public debt and deficits from Eurostat, spreads of 10-year bonds from 
OECD. Details are available by the author. 
 
All three factors are found to be statistically significant and with the correct sign in the long run 
relationship. In the short-run only public debt exerts a strong effect in raising the spread, while fiscal 
deficit is weak relative to the long run coefficient and with the wrong sign.  Current Account deficit 
has no significant effect in the short-run.  
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Appendix B: Tables 
 
TABLE 1 - Comparison of key economic variables in Greece 
 
Period averages (avg) Post EMU 2000-2003 
Post Olympics 
2004-2008 
Post crisis 
2009-2010 
Avg Net Revenues %GDP 26.36 22.66 21.42 
Avg Public Consumption %GDP 20.13 20.60 25.25 
Avg Primary Surplus %GDP 2.54 - 0.79 - 6.65 
  excl.public investment 6.23 1.67 - 3.84 
  Investment surplus -3.69 -2.47 -2.81 
    
Avg Gen. Government deficit %GDP 4.51 5.20 12.13 
    
Avg Debt rise in Euro bn, pa 9.00 18.68 31.90 
Avg GDP rise in Euro bn, pa 12.05 13.34 -0.41 
Period average Debt as %GDP 101.57 103.96 130.96 
Period total change in Debt %GDP - 4.63 * 10.71 27.14 
    
Avg Current Account as %GDP -5.55 -11.90 -10.48 
Avg Current Account in Euro bn -8.44 -26.37 -24.93 
    
Avg Growth rate % 4.51 3.42 -3.29 
Avg Inflation rate % 3.47 3.41 3.03 
 
Note: All figures denote annual average over the corresponding period, unless stated otherwise. Total changes 
for debt to GDP ratio are differences from end to the beginning of each period. Figures for 2010 are estimates as 
published in spring 2011. 
 
(*) A widely publicized currency swap took place between the Hellenic Republic and Goldman Sachs in mid-
2001 in order to convert debt liabilities from the rising Yen to Euro. The swap was based in historic exchange 
rates and resulted in a decline of the debt to GDP ratio by about 1.40% in 2001, in exchange for a rise in deficits 
by 0.15% of GDP in subsequent years, so that the overall fiscal position in present value terms remained 
unchanged.  The change in debt between 2000-2003 is reported here net of the above swap. Without this 
adjustment, the change in debt-to-GDP ratio would appear larger at -6.03 percentage units, based on the 
currently available AMECO dataset.  
In any case, the swap effect disappeared a few years later due to the rapid depreciation of the Yen against the 
Euro after 2002. Besides, the aforementioned swap was irrelevant for the eligibility of Greece entering the 
Eurozone in June 2000 as entry assessment was based exclusively on the performance of the economy up to 
1999. 
 
Sources: 1. Debt of General Government: ESA95 definition, Ameco Eurostat 2011, online.  
2. GDP at market prices, GDP growth rate and inflation rate: IMF WEO Database 2010. 
3. Fiscal figures: Annual Budget Reports, (various editions). 
4. Current Account: Bank of Greece, Statistical Bulletins (various editions).  
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TABLE 2 - Alternative scenaria for the debt-to-GDP ratio 
 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Deficit %GDP -10.40 -7.60 -6.50 -4.90 -2.60 -2.60 
Α. Inflation rate 1.4 1.3 0.9 1.1 1.1 1.1 
Β. Inflation rate 1.4 2 2 2 2 2 
Α. Growth rate -4.5 -3.8 0.6 2.1 2.3 2.3 
Β. Early growth -4.5 0.6 2.1 2.3 3 3 
Public debt %GDP       
A. Low growth and no 
privatizations 142.70 153.96 158.18 158.08 156.27 154.44 
B. Early growth and 
moderate privatizations 142.70 144.68 143.49 140.37 134.96 128.72 
C. Early growth and 
extensive privatizations 142.70 144.57 141.31 137.55 128.48 118.92 
 
Notes: Scenario A: recession continues and no privatization takes place. Scenario B: with early growth and 
moderate privatizations 2% of GDP per annum; Scenario C: with early growth and privatizations up to 4% of 
GDP per annum. 
 
Source: MTFP, 2011, and own calculations. 
  
 
 
100
Appendix C: Graphs  
 
FIGURE 1 - Greek public Debt as %GDP for the period 1990-2011 
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Source: Debt of General Government, ESA95 definition, Ameco Eurostat 2011, online. GDP at market 
prices, IMF WEO Database 2010, online. Figures for 2010, 2011 from IMF Report(2011). 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2 - Main debt-affecting factors as %GDP, 2000-2011 
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Source: Budget Reports, various editions. GDP at market prices, IMF WEO Database 2010. 
 
  
 
 
101
FIGURE 3 - Public consumption and revenues as %GDP in Greece, 2000-2011 
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Source: Budget Reports, various editions. GDP at market prices, IMF WEO Database 2010.  
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 4 - Proceeds from privatization, past and future 
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Note: For 2008 and 2009 proceeds are net of bank shares purchases, thus the negative sign. 
Source: Annual proceeds as reported by the Privatization Report, Ministry of Finance, 2008. Proceeds 
are net of capitalizations in state-owned enterprises. Data for 1996 and 1997 are taken from Budget 
Reports. Figures for Scenario C are taken from MTFP. For Scenario B own calculations. 
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FIGURE 5 - Current Account in Greece, 2000-2010 
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Source: Current Account in Euro billion, Bank of Greece, Statistical Bulletin (various editions). GDP at 
market prices, IMF WEO Database 2010.  
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 6 - Greek Bond yield curves for the period October 2009-May 2010 
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Source: Bank of Greece, Bulletin of Conjectural Indicators, Table IV.23, page 116, March 2011. 
 
 
  
 
 
103
FIGURE 7 - Two-period yield curves with varying degrees of fiscal commitment  
(θ=1: high resolve, θ=0: complacency) 
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Note: Parameter values were set as φ=0.30, λ=0.80, r=4%. 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 8 - The rise and fall in the index of public trust to Government  
regarding the economic situation 
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Source: Eurobarometer No. 69 (Table QA12), 70 (QA12), 71 (QA9.3), 72 (QA10), 73 (QA14) and 74 
(Greece, Slide 5).  
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FIGURE 9 - Monthly total revenues before and after the implementation of the 
bailout Memorandum (in Euro million) 
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Notes: Higher VAT rates were introduced in April 2010. The dim line spans the period April 2009-
March 2010, while the dark one the same period one year later. 
Source: Bank of Greece, Bulletin of Conjectural Indicators, various editions. 
 
 
 
FIGURE 10 - Alternative paths for public debt as % of GDP 
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Notes: (a) Official, as reported in Budget Report 2011. No extra action is considered. (b) Early growth 
starting at 2011 by 0.60% and moderate privatizations generating proceeds up to 2% of GDP per 
annum. (c) With growth as in (b) and extensive privatizations up to 4% of GDP per annum. 
Source: Budget Report 2011and MTFP (2011). 
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